DIGITAL ID & CBDCs

PSGRNZ's Stepping Back from the Brink (2024) discussion paper raised serious questions about the risks arising from the interoperability of digital identity systems and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and encouraged public debate about their wider implications.

In the two years since its publication, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has shifted towards a national payments modernisation programme. The digital cash/CBDC project is being advanced as part of the payments modernisation programme. This raises the prospect that infrastructure designed for payments modernisation could also accommodate the future introduction of a CBDC, without Parliament first determining whether such a development is desirable or in the public interest.

Although the RBNZ recently stated that they had 'assessed the case to introduce digital cash in New Zealand' (2025/26 Annual Report, page 26). We have been unable to confirm whether the RBNZ or any independent public law experts have undertaken substantive, independent evaluation of the democratic governance risks arising from CBDCs and their potential integration with other digital infrastructure, particularly concerning monetary authority, democratic accountability, constitutional constraints, privacy and informational autonomy, and the centralisation of institutional power. An OIA request has subsequently been sent to the Reserve Bank.

Further, PSGRNZ questions whether it is appropriate for the RBNZ to lead the Payments Modernisation programme (i.e. national real-time payments infrastructure design) that could facilitate CBDC implementation. There has not been explicit parliamentary scrutiny of the programme's scope, costs, technological implications and the democratic legitimacy. This includes the interoperable potential of digital cash/CBDCs which will necessarily entail programmable aspects.

Please don't be confused: Digital Cash and CBDC are the same technology.

The RBNZ downplay the key risks that make central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) dauntingly troublesome for democratic societies. The RBNZ call CBDC ‘digital cash’, yet this is misleading as it fails to clarify the major difference between unprogrammable digital cash in retail bank accounts – and central bank (RBNZ) controlled digital cash that will inevitably be programmable - CBDCs.

The Statement of intent 2024-2028 discussion of the Future of Money work programme recognised the Digital Cash project as an element of a larger work programme and expressly recognised what the RBNZ call 'digital cash' as a CBDC.:

Digital Cash: we are exploring introducing a digital form of central bank money as another form of central bank money, alongside cash. Digital cash is exploring the risks and opportunities as a consequence of the increasing digitalisation of money.

The September 28 2026 Amended Statement of Intent further confirmed that the RBNZ digital cash continues to be 'considered as part of our work on payments modernisation.' (PDF page 18). Yet this is being progressed with minimal public accountability.

RBNZ CONSULTATIONS

July 26, 2024. Digital cash in New Zealand. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) consultation on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).

PSGRNZ's response to the July 2024, second stage RBNZ consultation.

October 27, 2026. Modernising New Zealand’s retail payment system (RBNZ). The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) consultation on real-time payments platform as part of the Future of Money Work Programme. The CBDC project has been relocated inside this broader programme. (Related RBNZ August 18, 2026, Issues Paper).

PSGRNZ's response to the Modernising Payments, third stage RBNZ consultation (2 documents were sent to the RBNZ). Includes links to a September 2026 OIA request.

JR Bruning Official Information Act request:

2026-10-28 Extent of Legal, Constitutional and Democratic Governance Evaluation of Digital Cash/CBDCs and Interoperable Digital Infrastructure

PSGRNZ (2024) Stepping Back from the Brink: The Programmable Ledger. Four democratic risks that arise when Digital IDs are coupled to Central Bank Digital Currencies. Bruning, J.R., Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand. ISBN 978-0-473-71618-9. 2 page summary | Press release | Executive summary (Substack)

2025-2026 DEVELOPMENTS

Papers released under the Official Information Act 1982 show a much more expanded, integrative cross-government programme than what has been disclosed on the public-facing website.

The RBNZ is yet to address the politically and constitutionally concerning questions in this paper that were advanced by PSGRNZ in early 2024.

In May 2025 the RBNZ pivoted (Aide Memoire #6279), releasing a proposal to deliver the strategy for payments modernisation in New Zealand, that would provide it with a central role coordinating with key agencies and industry participants in modernising payments, and citing the opportunity of potential synergies with India's United Payments Interface (UPI). It was envisaged from commencement that this would overlap with public sector payments opportunities.

A February 2026 response (OIA2526_186) requesting disclosure of the November 2025 Briefing for the Incoming Governor showed that the RBNZ had:

pivoted to focus on a broader modernisation of New Zealand’s domestic retail payments infrastructure, of which Digital Cash would be a subset (a new rail in a new payments system) if it were decided to be an appropriate investment.

It showed that the RBNZ would work extensively across different sectors to enable these functions. The OIA response demonstrates that a broader implementation than the original four-stage pathway encompassing ‘legislative, regulatory and governance reform of the payments system’ is occurring.

A further 21-page release (OIA2526-140) explained that the RBNZ’s recent Digital Cash work had concentrated on developing a business case, but that it considered a wider examination of retail payments infrastructure appropriate.

In seeking ministerial endorsement of the RBNZ proposal that itself would lead this programme, it stated that Treasury, MBIE, DIA, Commerce Commission, FMA and Public Service Commission had been consulted, and RBNZ stated that those agencies as broadly supportive of it taking the strategic leadership role. The paper noted that the RBNZ would have an expanded role (Board Paper for Decision 2.3):

‘legislative reform … to formalise mandates and oversight powers across regulators, and to support the delivery and operation of new infrastructure.’ [1]

The issue has now moved beyond whether New Zealand should introduce a retail CBDC to the RBNZ actively expanding its focus to modernising the wider payments system, including consideration of a Unified Payments Interface (UPI)-like fast-payment system. The Bank has raised its concern that New Zealand risks falling technologically behind, increasing reliance on offshore payment providers and reducing domestic control over critical payments infrastructure. The concern appears to include what RBNZ describes as potential market failure:

An example of market failure is that the low cost EFTPOS network is likely to REDACTED 9(2)(b)(i), 6(b) leaving New Zealand almost wholly dependent on high-cost international scheme products and “rails” for retail payments.’ [2]

In an April 2025 communication to the Minister of Finance, Nicola Willis, the RBNZ noted that [3]:

The declining support for EFTPOS by industry participants and their increasing dependence on scheme (Visa and Mastercard) solutions for retail payments creates increasing risk for the resilience and efficiency and cost of New Zealand’s disaggregated payments landscape, which in turn has implications for productivity and economic growth. Modern real-time payments systems are prevalent globally, in both advanced and emerging economies, while New Zealand is now the only OECD country without a modern real-time payments system.

An RBNZ Aide Memoire points to India's UPI as a possible model. Importantly, UPI is not itself a CBDC. It is a payments infrastructure that carries private bank money, while also providing an acceptance network for India's pilot Digital Rupee CBDC. However, India's UPI system is connected to an ID system that requires biometric data and which, by its sheer scale, effectively compels citizen participation.

The potential modernisation of New Zealand's payments infrastructure could deliver many of the claimed benefits of faster and cheaper digital payments without requiring the introduction of a retail (e.g. public facing) CBDC.

However, this April 17, Aide Memoire from the Assistant Governor to the Minister of Finance reveals that the RBNZ is actively seeking to work with foreign jurisdictions on the matter of expanding this area.[4]:

We have previously briefed you on our Digital Cash (central bank digital currency) work. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of potential synergies between our Digital Cash work and broader payments modernisation, focusing and building on recent engagement with the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI).

As a part of our Digital Cash work, we are engaging with other government agencies with an operational interest in payments. To date this has been focussed on sharing information about Digital Cash and some of the broader opportunities for efficiency and innovation for their operational and policy needs.

The Aide Memoir explained the UPI functionality:

‘a digital infrastructure that enables real-time payments, allowing instant money transfers between bank accounts using mobile devices. It supports both peer-to-peer (P2P) and person-to-merchant (P2M) transactions, improving efficiency, competition, innovation, and financial inclusion.’ The … ‘UPI connects various products and services, including

instant payments, offline payments, a domestic debit and credit scheme, and welfare payments. The primary acceptance method is QR code-based payments, which are available free of charge to small merchants across India.’

This paper reveals a deliberate intention to integrate CBDCs as a 'rail' into the payments system, notwithstanding that in July 2025 the Treasury was expressing that there was ‘limited clarity around the associated costs or whether the benefits would ultimately outweigh these costs.’[5]

In mid-2026 the RBNZ subsequently commenced consultation on Modernising New Zealand’s retail payment system (RBNZ), despite internal documents that show CBDCs are expressly considered a potential part of this system, CBDCs and the power to insert them into a future payments system was not a subject of public discussion during that consultation.

PSGRNZ expressed concern in our response to this consultation that the RBNZ did not seem to enable responses that did not fit its ideas of how the process might work and that the information capture 'tick box' process was unsatisfactory for its stated purpose.

STATEMENTS OF INTENT: HAVE NEW ZEALAND MPs READ THE FINE PRINT?

We are concerned about the increasing lack of financial transparency and the absence of programme-level financial accountability regarding the digital cash/CBDC programme. Further, we are concerned about the reduction in powers of oversight of New Zealand members of Parliament. Although the RBNZ operates under an agreed institutional funding framework, it has not publicly identified a dedicated budget, expenditure history or financial reporting arrangements for payments modernisation or the digital cash work now incorporated within it. The scale of the financial commitment, including any future infrastructure expenditure, therefore remains unclear.

Under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021, Parliament established a statutory framework that removed the previous requirement for the House to ratify Reserve Bank funding agreements (discussed in more detail below).

The RBNZ's retail CBDC project occupies an unusual funding position. Under s 209(5)(b)(viii) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021, the Minister of Finance and RBNZ agreed that expenditure on the CBDC capital project, including preparation of its detailed business case and 'subsequent costs and expenses', is exempt from the ordinary limits imposed by the Five-Year Funding Agreement.[6] [7] [8]

The ‘introduction of a Central Bank Digital Currency’ is described by Treasury as a ‘large capital project’. Somewhat remarkably, it is an accounting decision to place the funding of the CBDC programme refurbishment and infrastructure spending outside the ordinary funding envelope:

Costs and expenses incurred by the RBNZ in preparing the detailed business cases and subsequent costs and expenses for the following capital projects: 2 The Terrace refurbishment or replacement; New cash vaulting infrastructure; Central Bank Digital Currency

Unlike specified exemptions for currency production and implementation of the Deposit Takers Act, the CBDC exemption contains no stated monetary ceiling.

The Funding Agreement is required to be presented to Parliament but, under the 2021 Act, is no longer subject to parliamentary ratification. While this mechanism does not itself authorise the issuance of a retail CBDC, it permits potentially substantial expenditure on developing the project outside the ordinary funding limits before Parliament has made any decision on whether New Zealand should issue a retail CBDC.

Therefore, the particular decision to exempt CBDC business-case and subsequent project expenditure from the ordinary funding limits was not expressly authorised by a parliamentary vote.

Members of Parliament no longer have approval or veto rights over the expenditure limits established through the RBNZ Five-Year Funding Agreement. The agreement is negotiated between the RBNZ and the Minister of Finance and progressed through executive and Cabinet processes. Once signed, it takes effect without parliamentary ratification and is subsequently presented to the House rather than submitted to it for approval.

Importantly, the Minister is required to present a copy of a funding agreement or a variation of a funding agreement to the House of Representatives within 12 sitting days after the agreement or variation is entered into.[9] Members of Parliament have no approval or veto rights.

In parliamentary practice, however, presentation does not require the Minister to address the House, explain the document, initiate debate or seek a vote. A Minister may present a paper simply by delivering it through the Clerk of the House. Its presentation is then recorded in the Journals and the document made available to MPs.

The RBNZ Statement of intent 2024-2028 and Statements of Performance Expectations (2025/2026 and 2026/27) were the only reports that could be identified from a search in the Publications Library for ‘digital cash’ or ‘CBDC’ from October 2024-August 2026.[10] [11] [12]

The Statements of Performance Expectations do not discuss the Future of Money programme or digital cash. One line reveals that the funding for the RBNZs CBDC strategy has been expressly excluded and classified as ‘excluded expenditure’. It is in fine print:

Due to the font being small we have reproduced the text:

Expenses incurred by the RBNZ which are excluded from the funding agreement include:

(b) The following expenditure agreed by the Minister of Finance and the Bank to be exempt expenditure under section 209(5)

(vii) Costs and expenses incurred by the Bank to prepare detailed business cases and subsequent costs and expenses for the following capital projects; 2 The Terrace refurbishment or replacement, new cash vaulting infrastructure, and Central Bank Digital Currency; [13] [14]

EXCLUDED EXPENDITURE OUTSIDE THE FIVE-YEAR FUNDING AGREEMENT

The RBNZ's 2026/27 Statement of Performance Expectations document records the excluded expenditure outside its ordinary Five-Year Funding Agreement at $49 million in 2025/26, increasing to $74 million in expenditure in 2026/27. These sums cover several activities and cannot exclusively be attributed to CBDC development.

The 2026 Annual Report confirmed that $29 million and $56 million would be excluded from the funding agreement.

The exemption covers not only preparation of a detailed CBDC business case, but also ‘subsequent costs and expenses’ associated with the CBDC capital project. Unlike some other exempt expenditure categories, the agreement specifies no monetary ceiling for CBDC expenditure.

PSGRNZ cannot see a monetary ceiling attached specifically to CBDC expenditure in the agreement and we have been unable to identify any budgetary estimates.

However, if CBDC expenditure has expressly been exempted from the ordinary funding limits, and the quoted sums are vague with respect to how the CBDC/digital cash campaign, which includes work undertaken for the wider work programme – the question arises: If Parliament has not authorised a retail CBDC, what precisely is the statutory and appropriation/accountability pathway by which RBNZ can incur those ‘subsequent costs and expenses’?

The direct effect is that members of Parliament do not need to read the agreement and evaluate its meaning. The Funding Agreement needs only to be lodged on the parliamentary website under:

Home > Parliamentary > Business > Papers Presented> Current Papers[16]

Parliament's Papers Presented record shows that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Te Pūtea Matua, 2025–2030 Five-Year Funding Agreement, RBNZ Forecast Operating and Capital Expenditure Budgets[17], April 2025, published date April 29, 2025, sits on the parliamentary page. It contains only three pages of text.

As of August 2026, The RBNZ statement of performance expectations for 2026/27 had not been presented to the House (though previous statements have been). The bank’s performance expectations would likely be examined by select committee as part of the financial scrutiny cycle.

However, while the agreement is formally available to members; it does not require parliamentary debate or approval.

2021 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES LED TO REDUCED PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY IN 2025

The first five-year Funding Agreement made wholly under the new regime expressly excluded CBDC business-case and subsequent project expenditure from its ordinary expenditure limits.

The RBNZ’s Funding Agreement with the Minister of Finance, and the Statement of Performance Expectations 2026/27 lodges the cost of CBDCs alongside office refurbishment and new cash vaulting infrastructure (without clarifying the extent of budget set aside for CBDCs); and the Statement of Intent (2024-2028) states that New Zealand is investigating them, moving later in the document to exclusively refer to CBDCs as ‘digital cash’ without providing clear explanation.

The first new five-year Funding Agreement operating entirely under the 2021 Act's regime in which parliamentary ratification was no longer required, was also the first Funding Agreement expressly to create a capital-project expenditure exemption which would include any budgeted funding of CBDCs.

There has been a material reduction in direct parliamentary control over the RBNZ Funding Agreement. The statutory Funding Agreements are five-year agreements. The 2025–30 agreement is especially important because it is the first full five-year agreement under the 2021 Act and, from the material we have found, the first one to expressly name Central Bank Digital Currency as a capital project whose detailed business-case and subsequent expenditure can sit outside the ordinary funding limits.

The previous legislation required Parliament to approve RBNZ's five-year Funding Agreement by resolution before it could take effect. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021 removed this requirement. Under the new regime, the Funding Agreement is agreed between the Minister of Finance and the RBNZ and subsequently presented to the House, but MPs are no longer required to vote to approve it. It is not known what rationale was given around 2020–21 for replacing parliamentary ratification with the new Minister–RBNZ funding mechanism?

Treasury's Regulatory Impact Assessment: A New Institutional Framework for the Reserve Bank[18] argued that greater flexibility was required as the funding agreement could be amended at any time. Although the existing legislation allowed a funding agreement to be amended at any time by agreement between the Minister and the RBNZ, amendments had been rare. Treasury considered that the requirement for the funding agreement, and any amendment, to be ratified by Parliament reduced flexibility and may have discouraged amendments. Treasury also criticised the existing funding process as lacking transparency, because it provided insufficient detail to stakeholders about how funding levels were determined and how funds would be allocated across the RBNZ's functions.

The reforms therefore sought greater transparency through more detailed budgets, publication and reporting. However, this was accompanied by the removal of a different and important form of transparency and accountability: formal parliamentary ratification. Rather than requiring elected representatives to approve the five-year Funding Agreement by resolution before it could take effect, the new framework required the agreement and supporting budget to be tabled in Parliament. In it’s assessment, the Treasury considered parliamentary ratification ‘unnecessary’, arguing that tabling, Annual Reviews and other reporting mechanisms would provide sufficient parliamentary oversight.

Publication and tabling can increase the amount of information technically available to MPs and the public, while simultaneously reducing Parliament's decision-making authority. Under the former regime, MPs were required to vote to ratify the Funding Agreement.

Under the new regime, the agreement can be formally ‘presented to the House’ through the parliamentary papers process. In practice, the parliamentary papers process is the lodgement on the parliamentary website, without elected representatives being required to read the RBNZ Funding Agreement and understand its import, or to debate or approve it.

Thus, a reform intended to improve flexibility and informational transparency also shifted an element of financial control away from Parliament and towards the Minister and the RBNZ.

SEPTEMBER 2026 AMENDED STATEMENT OF INTENT

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's (RBNZ) September 2026 Amended Statement of Intent 2024–2028 signals a significant shift in its strategic direction. The RBNZ has moved from exploring improvements to payment systems and digital cash as separate workstreams towards leading a coordinated national payments modernisation programme, following endorsement by the Minister of Finance. A formal industry working group is now involved in developing system requirements, governance arrangements, technical standards and an implementation roadmap. Significantly, the RBNZ confirms that digital cash, its term for a central bank digital currency (CBDC), is now being considered within payments modernisation. This raises questions about whether the future payments infrastructure could be designed to accommodate CBDCs before Parliament has determined whether their introduction is desirable or appropriate.

Despite these substantial changes, the amended statement provides no dedicated budget, expenditure history or financial reporting arrangements for either payments modernisation or the digital cash programme now incorporated within it. Although the RBNZ discloses its overall five-year funding agreement, the financial commitments associated with these programmes remain unidentified.

The Statement of intent 2024-2028 discussed the Future of Money work programme. However, while the statement discloses the Bank's aggregate five-year funding limits, it provides no programme-specific budget, expenditure history or accounting treatment for either payments modernisation or digital cash. I.e. there is no disclosed budget.

The 2026 Annual Report also identifies that $56 million in expenditure has been excluded from the funding agreement, but does not separately identify digital cash expenditure or establish whether such costs fall within or outside the agreement. The reorganisation therefore raises an important question of financial traceability: how are the costs and commitments of the former digital cash programme being recorded and disclosed following its incorporation into payments modernisation?

Despite this, the RBNZ has also introduced three strategic priorities, including strengthening trust and transparency, yet it remains unclear how the public interest will be independently assessed, how programme expenditure will be scrutinised, and what role Parliament will have in determining whether CBDCs should be introduced.

Are decisions that could reshape New Zealand's monetary and payments infrastructure are being progressively embedded in administrative and technical processes before New Zealanders and their elected representatives have been given a meaningful opportunity to determine whether CBDCs should be introduced at all?

Prima facie - it seems that the RBNZ may be intent upon CBDCs whether or not the people of New Zealand and our elected members of Parliament even want them.

REFERENCES

[1] RBNZ (February 11, 2026). Response to OIA2526_140: Information about CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) and Digital Payments. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/oias/2026/mar-2026/oia2526_140--central-bank-digital-currency-and-digital-payments.pdf

[2] RBNZ (February 11, 2026). Response to OIA2526_140: Information about CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) and Digital Payments. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/oias/2026/mar-2026/oia2526_140--central-bank-digital-currency-and-digital-payments.pdf

[3] RBNZ (April 17, 2025). Aide Memoire: Payments Infrastructure and Digital Cash. #6279. To Hon Nicola Willis. From Karen Silk Assistant Governor. Page 2. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/information-releases/2026/payments-infrastructure-and-digital-cash-6279.pdf

[4] RBNZ (April 17, 2025). Aide Memoire: Payments Infrastructure and Digital Cash. #6279. To Hon Nicola Willis. From Karen Silk Assistant Governor. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/information-releases/2026/payments-infrastructure-and-digital-cash-6279.pdf

[5] The Treasury (July 22, 2025). Meeting with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Board T2025/1755 CM-1-3-122-8-4-M120497 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2026-02/rbnz25-review-5185337.pdf

[6] The Treasury (April 2025). EXP-25-SUB-0037 Reserve Bank of New Zealand Five-Year Funding Agreement 2025-30. https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-04/cabinet-paper-exp-25-sub-0037-rbnz-five-year-funding-agreement-2025-30.pdf

[7] The Treasury (September 2025) Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2025-30 Funding Agreement . https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-09/t2025-190-5068512.pdf

[8] RBNZ (April 9, 2025). Funding Agreement Between The Minister of Finance and The Reserve Bank of New Zealand https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/funding-agreements/2025-30-funding-agreement.pdf

[9] Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021. https://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2021/31/en/latest/

[10] RBNZ (Undated) Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statement of Intent 2024-2028. ISSN 1177-9144 (online). https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/statements-of-intent/statement-of-intent-2024---2028.pdf

[11] RBNZ (Undated) Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statement of Performance Expectations 2025/26. ISSN 2815-8679 (Online) Page 25. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/statement-of-performance-expectations/statement-of-performance-expectations-2025-to-2026.pdf

[12] RBNZ (Undated) Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statement of Performance Expectations 2026/27. ISSN 2815-8679 (Online). https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/statement-of-performance-expectations/statement-of-performance-expectations-2026-to-2027.pdf

[13] RBNZ (Undated) Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statement of Performance Expectations 2025/26. ISSN 2815-8679 (Online) Page 25. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/statement-of-performance-expectations/statement-of-performance-expectations-2025-to-2026.pdf

[14] RBNZ (Undated) Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statement of Performance Expectations 2026/27. ISSN 2815-8679 (Online). https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/statement-of-performance-expectations/statement-of-performance-expectations-2026-to-2027.pdf

[15] RBNZ (Undated) Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statement of Performance Expectations 2026/27. ISSN 2815-8679 (Online) Pages 20-21. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/statement-of-performance-expectations/statement-of-performance-expectations-2026-to-2027.pdf

[16] https://bills.parliament.nz/papers?Tab=Current

[17] New Zealand Parliament (April 29, 2025). Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Te Pūtea Matua, 2025–2030 Five-Year Funding Agreement, RBNZ Forecast Operating and Capital Expenditure Budgets. https://bills.parliament.nz/v/4/3e548f72-4a8e-49df-258d-08dd8142cef9?lang=en

[18] The Treasury. Regulatory Impact Assessment: A New Institutional Framework for the Reserve Bank, originally December 2019 and updated March 2020 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2020-07/ria-tsy-rbnz-jul20.pdf

STEPPING BACK FROM THE BRINK: The Programmable Ledger. Four democratic risks that arise when Digital IDs are coupled to Central Bank Digital Currencies (2026)

2025-2026 DEVELOPMENTS

EXCLUDED EXPENDITURE OUTSIDE THE FIVE-YEAR FUNDING AGREEMENT

SEPTEMBER 2026 AMENDED STATEMENT OF INTENT

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