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The Ministry for the Environment (MftE) propose to amend the Resource Management (National Environmental Standards for Telecommunication Facilities) Regulations 2016.[1] (Hereafter referred to as NESTF Regs 2016).

An Interim Regulatory Impact Statement proposing the deregulation of the NESTF Regs 2016 was finalised April 16, 2025, a Package 1 Discussion Document was released in May 2025 with a corresponding Attachment 1.5. The proposing Ministers are Hon Chris Bishop, Minister Responsible for RMA Reform and Minister for Infrastructure. Hon Paul Goldsmith, Minister for Media and Communication.

Consultation closed: 27 July 2025.

PDF COPY: PSGRNZ’S SUBMISSION TO THE NESTF CONSULTATION

The proposed NESTF Regs 2016 proposal would substantially weaken restrictions – but any public questioning of the safety of such an action was ruled out of scope.

The Interim Regulatory Impact Statement and the proposals in the Discussion Document (Part 2.5) propose significant and extensive deregulatory status for a broad group of technical devices which emit Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields (RF-EMF). MBIE and the MftE propose to remove authority from regions and communities to decide on the appropriate location of these devices and they propose to expand the category definition and sweep other devices inside this category.

PSGR RECOMMENDATIONS:

PSGR recommended that the proposals are not accepted. Relevant Consultation questions are listed at the end of the document. The arguments supporting the proposal are weak and exclusively revolve around administrative costs.

New Zealand has an extensive fibre optic broadband network (coverage is at 87% while uptake lags) and broadband satellite supports remote connectivity.

This was not considered in the policy documents. Fibre optic networks do not present the same safety risks as Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields (RF-EMF) and are relatively politically uncontroversial. A significant weight of evidence, including mechanistic data strongly suggests that low dose Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields (RF-EMF) at levels currently considered safe, and lower, can harm vertebrate systems. An increasing battery of evidence strongly suggests that prenatal and postnatal exposures, and exposures in childhood and youth carry additional risks that are insufficiently assessed in New Zealand. In addition, increasing literature highlights increasing hypersensitivity to RF-EMF.[2]

PSGR recommended that special attention is given to poor scientific process by the Ministry of Health, who fail to review the scientific literature on non-thermal effects from RF-EMF and instead harmonise with an institution that itself, does not follow independent scientific process to establish guidelines.

The Ministry of Health in 2018, 2019 and 2022 released unauthored reports which were timed to reflect reports published by ICNIRP in 2018 and 2021, an organisation that self-references and releases publications which are held up as ‘best practice’ but is tightly associated with industry associations. Their policy papers fail to acknowledge the increasing weight of evidence that shows that RF-EMF do not merely harm by heating effects, but that harm occurs non-thermally.

Monitoring studies remain undone, and the MoH does not consider risk from chronic exposures. The increasing concentration (or density) of radiofrequency electromagnetic fields radiation (RF-EMF) that occurs through cell towers, small cell towers, cell phones, and wireless technologies results in chronic lifetime exposures from conception, until death. Therefore, simple dose response studies will not elucidate the complexity of risks that arise in a pregnant mother, a baby, infant, child, adolescent – all the way through to risk in aged care from persistent RF-EMF radiation.

As such any deregulatory actions by MftE and the responsible agency MBIE will be poorly timed, due to the advancing literature which suggests that current claimed safe levels cannot protect health. The mechanisms of harm, including at low-levels, currently claimed safe, were recently beautifully described by Dimitris Panagopoulos and colleagues and which PSGR discuss in a forthcoming release.

As PSGR has discussed, current policies restrict the freedom for scientists to undertake this sort of basic research and so it is not undertaken.

The MftE and MBIE claim that the deregulated telecommunications facilities would be ‘low impact’. It may be presumed that panel antennas, dish antennas and small cell units are low impact, however no definition has been provided.

PSGR recognise that this policy proposal, may be hastily convened to secure weaker standards in advance of increasing acceptance of health risk from non-thermal effects. MBIE’s industry colleagues, may recognise that Ministry of Health claims concerning the alleged safety of non-thermal exposures, supporting the lock-in of relatively high exposure levels, are scientifically indefensible.

The economic impact of digital fibre/satellite infrastructure – not more antennas!

Fibre technology continuously evolves, giving us faster speeds, lower latencies, improved resiliency, greater security, and more flexible applications. Speed records are consistently being broken.[3]

The New Zealand Government initiated the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) initiative in 2009 with the rollout commencing in 2010. Fibre networks are safer than telecommunications facilities (including towers, antennas and small cells on power poles) and politically uncontroversial. Currently 87% of New Zealanders have access to fibre broadband and New Zealand ranks 9^th in terms of fixed broadband connectivity.

Ministry officials argument for deregulation focused exclusively on reduced regulatory costs for the telecommunications industry and did not consider safety. There is no requirement for greater densification of towers and antennas in New Zealand urban environments which have in the majority, fibre-optic cabling. Connectivity from handheld devices is demonstrated to be associated with cancer risk and household access to fibre broadband is high. Devices can be more safely enabled through wifi, and devices can remain on airplane mode. The long-term operational performance and reduced maintenance may make fibre optic cabling more economically feasible over the longer term.[4]

The issue that the government needs to address is uptake of broadband connectivity for lower income groups.

‘Nearly a quarter of Pacific peoples are without the internet in the home – three times the rate for New Zealand Europeans and almost twice the rate for Māori. Māori and Pacific peoples are particularly over-represented among younger people without internet access.’

Remote and rural businesses and residences are extensively served by satellite-enabled telecommunications. Starlink supplies broadband to New Zealanders via OneNZ. Starlink is the largest constellation supplying data to New Zealand and, of the 38 systems providing data in the future, it is expected to remain so. Direct-to-satellite mobile services and satellite systems form part of the network architecture, enhance early warning and emergency communications.

More antennas and towers will not add to wellbeing and quality of life for most Kiwis.

PROPOSING POLICIES ARE NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE:

Risk to New Zealand people, is central to this discussion. The proposal substantially expands categories without any focus on emissions risk yet explicitly drafts out any discussion of risk despite the deregulatory context of the proposal – that low-impact telecommunication facilities do not require regulation. The designation ‘low-impact’ is not technically defined in relation to RF-EMF emission strength, leaving unaddressed the potential for approved infrastructure to operate at higher transmission power within permitted thresholds.

The claim that the telecommunication facilities are ‘low impact’ has not been accompanied by any scientifically rigorous analysis. Low-impact is not defined in the 2016 regulations, the 2016 Users Guide, the 2025 Interim Regulatory Impact Statement nor the proposed policy. [5] [6] The Interim RIS did not provide a technical definition as to what a ‘low impact’ would constitute whether an emitting device or a region. As such, there is no disclosure as to the technology spectrum emitted by the claimed ‘low impact’ and any risks in urban environments and to vulnerable communities.

The Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) demonstrates that the health of New Zealanders is not at the forefront of the current policy initiative. Health relating to exposures is explicitly drafted out of scope:[7] There is no evidence for benefits and well-being from this policy proposal, indeed the greater evidence in the literature suggests risk.

Policy problem: The changes to NES-TF is to enable ‘greater efficiency in the deployment of telecommunications infrastructure’. The policy problem is concerned with ‘low impact telecommunication facilities (e.g. antennas, cabinets, poles, telecommunication lines)’ where ‘current rules in NES-TF are too restrictive and do not cover certain low impact telecommunication facilities. This is resulting in the inefficient deployment of telecommunications infrastructure.’ Where a new facility is not currently permitted, telecommunication providers must obtain resource consents which ‘uncertainty, complexity, significant costs and delays for deploying telecommunications infrastructure and services’.

Policy objective: To ‘support efficient deployment of low impact telecommunication facilities that meet the needs of New Zealand households and businesses’ and limit the capacity for territorial and local authorities to set their own standards. The approach consolidates agency power away from local governments. The policy mandate from Cabinet in June 2024 was to make changes to NES-TF [CAB-24-MIN 0246 refers], and so non-regulatory options (such as guidance for councils, voluntary standards, or global consents) were not considered.

Out of Scope (pages 20-22):

Guidance for councils, voluntary standards or global consents) were not considered. Officials also consider that non-regulatory options would be inadequate in addressing the problem definition.
Established protections relating to environmentally significant places and areas.
[47] Changes to radio frequency exposure standards are out of scope. Under NES-TF, telecommunications providers need to comply with the New Zealand radio frequency exposure standard NZS 2772.1:1999 by reference, which is administered and reviewed by the Ministry of Health and Health New Zealand (Te Whatu Ora). The protections for radio frequency exposures will be maintained with no changes. The Ministry of Health and Health New Zealand advised that the references to NZS 2772.1:1999 align with international best practice and remain fit for purpose.

The policy problem and objective has excluded any obligation to ensure the health and safety and hence protection of local communities. This has been enabled through fragmented and outdated policy and legislation which enables the Ministers for the Environment and for Media and Communication to prima facie absolve themselves from any risks that arise as a consequence of such a policy change.

The MftE and MBIE have not made a genuine effort to identify, understand, and estimate the various categories of cost and benefit associated with the options for change.

Reports and data are not held by the Ministry of Health, MBIE, or the MftE to that signal ongoing monitoring, evaluation and reporting that would demonstrate that the agencies have the health of New Zealanders front and centre of this proposal. There is no route for reporting by hypersensitive groups, or groups and individuals that report shifts in health and wellness after a telecommunication facility is installed. Reporting of cases, and documenting them, produces a bank of policy-relevant information. Yet by failing to do this, authorities create a barrier to evidence. Global case studies are identifying changes in health status, and there should not be barriers to reporting this in New Zealand.[8] [9] [10]

There has been no systematic impact and risk analysis. No review of best-practice and the actions of countries that have more tightly regulated equipment, with awareness that the advancing science continues to fail to demonstrate absence of risk and increase knowledge of vulnerability, particularly in key developmental periods. The policy and subsequent proposals do not conform to any standard of safety and risk and are not evidence informed. Neither the RIS nor the Package 1, Part 2.5 NESTF proposal does not conform to good regulatory practice, which is required by The Treasury.[11]

The supporting policy documents fail to review the safety of the status quo, against international best practice and compare this to the claimed safety of the proposed measures in the Consultation. The main argument appears to be to promote ‘efficiency’ because ‘the current rules in NES-TF are too restrictive and do not cover certain low impact telecommunication facilities’. Benefits are structured around reducing consenting costs, claiming that it would reduce downward pressure on prices for consumers, and reduced administrative costs for councils. The benefits are exclusively structure around efficient and timely deployment. No financial assessment was provided. The RIS stated: [12]

Based on the information held, officials consider that the benefits of the proposed changes to NES-TF outweigh the costs.

Responsibility to monitor and reassess the safety of the current allowable electromagnetic exposure limits appears to be drafted out of any white paper or regulatory legislation that has been produced, at minimum in the last decade. Safety was referred to in the RIS – but there was no discussion of the costs of monitoring to ensure that there was standards compliance, and the cumulative level of radiation emissions would not exceed limits.

The action of MBIE and MftE to deregulate reflects a global pattern, where governments act to centralise regulatory power and oversight over the deployment and location of telecommunications facilities, and constrain regulatory discretion. These streamlining clauses remove local government autonomy over these decisions.[13] [14]

However, globally, regions are contesting this increasing regulatory oversight, with increasing numbers of local resolutions being passed (e.g. Hawaii) and with countries independently acting to lower radio radiofrequency exposure limits. These ordinances are feasible because of fibre optic broadband. [15] [16]

Ministry of Health science inadequate for the purpose of policy development:

Public trust in the safety of telecommunications NESTF regulations based on Ministry of Health claims of the alleged safety of non-thermal exposures, cannot be sustained. The regulations are predicated on current standards (NESTF Regs 2016, Subpart 7) being safe.

The standards are upheld by claims of the ‘evidence’ for safety, which arises from unauthored ‘Reports to Ministers’ that are expected to be scientifically authoritative but lack any comprehensive methodology that heavily references a non-government institution which itself fails to demonstrate scientific rigor.

Public trust cannot be expected to be sustained when the government

Explicitly excludes discussion of major concerns about health risk.
Does not transparently publish and update monitoring data.
Does not evaluate such data against published data on risk (including in vitro, case control and cohort studies).
Does not compare NZS 2772.1 with maximum-allowable standards elsewhere, particularly in Russia and Europe.

The NZS 2772.1:1999 is now 26 years out of date. This New Zealand Standard remains in force comprehensively relitigated -- and not by members of ICNIRP, which is closely associated with the telecommunications industry. In the current consultation public concerns as to the safety of the measures would be dismissed as outside the scope of the current proposal.

The New Zealand Ministry of Health has tended to downplay and dismiss cancer risk, while European reviews tend to take risks more seriously. A 2021 European review recognised the seriousness of the cancer risk, finding that radiofrequency radiation is harmful for health[17], while a Committee reviewing 5G deployment stated that:[18]

The 5G radio emission fields are quite different to those of previous generations because of their complex beamformed transmissions in both directions – from base station to handset and for the return. Although fields are highly focused by beams, they vary rapidly with time and movement and so are unpredictable, as the signal levels and patterns interact as a closed loop system. This has yet to be mapped reliably for real situations, outside the laboratory.

Increasingly, standards in European countries more closely reflect these risks.

5G carrier waves create added complexity and health risks that increase risk-based uncertainties:

Use a much broader part of the microwave spectrum including waves with wavelengths in the millimetre range (hence called ‘millimetre waves’).
Extremely complex modulation patterns involving numerous frequencies form novel exposures.
Beam formation[19] characteristics can produce hotspots of high unknown intensities.
Increased numbers of antenna arrays and small cell antennas (which are erected at 200-500m distances along streets) increase exposures.[20]

WHO SETS THE RULES? LIKELY PUBLIC CONFUSION

The 2016 regulations are made under the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA) and replace the Resource Management (National Environmental Standards for Telecommunication Facilities) Regulations 2008. While the Resource Management (National Environmental Standards for Telecommunication Facilities) Regulations 2008 were previously administered by the MftE, the Order in Council NESTF Regs 2016 transferred powers of administration to the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE).

MBIE’s Minister for Media and Communications, (not the Minister for the Environment) sets the policy direction for the communications regulatory system and related infrastructure investments. Funding for MBIE’s components of this portfolio is provided from the Vote Business, Science and Innovation appropriations. As such, there is capacity to provide for monitoring and scientific research to ensure that wireless communications networks are safely stewarded to protect human and environmental health. This is not currently happening.

The Ministry of Health has an outsized role which is unrecognised in the current policy document.

Legal status is established for the standards in Subpart 7 – Radiofrequency fields. Section 55(6) [21]:

§ AS/NZS 2772.2 means AS/NZS 2772.2:2016 Radiofrequency fields – Part 2: Principles and methods of measurement and computation – 3 kHz to 300 GHz

§ NZS 2772.1 means NZS 2772.1:1999 Radiofrequency fields – Maximum exposure levels – 3 kHz to 300 GHz.

The standards in section 55(6) were developed under Ministry of Health recommendations which became legally binding once incorporated into the RMA regulations.

The regulatory framework delegates assessments of risk and safety—including those underlying the proposed 2025 deregulatory measures—to the Ministry of Health. The scientific basis for the safety of the guidelines in section 55(6) rests on the conclusions of an anonymous and unattributed technical advisory body: the Interagency Committee on the Health Effects of Non-ionising Fields (the Committee).[22]

Historically, MftE and MoH had published National Guidelines on Managing the Health Effects of Radiofrequency Transmissions (2000). [23]

‘A key function of the Committee is to review recent research findings, especially recent research reviews published by national and international health and scientific bodies, to determine whether it should recommend any changes to current policies.’ [24]

As such, the Ministry of Health is ‘ground zero’ for administering and reviewing New Zealand radio frequency exposure standards which then enable MBIE, who control the regulations, to deregulate and weaken standards, due to a claimed safety.

As PSGR reference above, any criticism about the safety of current guideline levels has been explicitly drafted out of scope[25] and the policy document advise that Ministry of Health and Health New Zealand advise that:

NZS 2772.1:1999 align with international best practice and remain fit for purpose.

NO ESTABLISHED THRESHOLD WHEN HARM STARTS IN BABIES, CHILDREN & ADULTS

The current safety threshold for adverse RF-EMF effects remains unknown and risk arises from the dynamic interplay between telecommunications infrastructure and whatever device is currently in use. The weight of evidence for risk from RF-EMF emissions presents a complex policy challenge that cannot be delegated to personal responsibility or left to industry self-regulation.

The scientific literature currently does not support further deregulation of telecommunications infrastructure that emits RF-EMF radiation. Evidence supports increasing caution based on the ALARA principle, as low as reasonably achievable, which can be enabled though maximising optic fibre broadband. There is currently no evidence for safety to vulnerable populations: pregnant mothers, infants, children, adolescents and sensitive populations – and harm in early years can translate to years lived with disease, and lower quality of life.

RF-EMF exposures impose an unavoidable burden on vulnerable individuals, denying them the basic right to protect their health in shared environments — an invisible breach of bodily autonomy. A society that saturates its environment with involuntary RF-EMF exposures, knowing some are harmed, cannot claim to uphold the principles of precaution, justice, or public health.

New Zealand policies can proactively care while increasing access to broadband. This includes monitoring and reporting by government agencies, emphasising risk when devices are not on airplane mode, and encouraging downloads before leaving home. Streaming while moving through environments increases risk to health, and telecommunications devices can be kept a strict distance from places where people work, play and sleep to minimise the probability of biological effects, particularly to babies and children. Other, technically practical solutions can reduce the exposures to people from mobile phones, and optical fibre solutions can be emphasised and supported in policy.[26]

The New Zealand NZS 2772.1:1999 standard aligns with the weakest global standards. It provides for a 61 V/m limit (equivalent to 10 W/m² power density at 2–300 GHz) is a generic limit applied uniformly across all environments — schools, homes, public spaces. There are no stricter limits for sensitive environments (e.g. childcare centres and hospitals). No differentiation is made for vulnerable populations. New Zealand does not consider that non-thermal exposures and hypersensitivity are scientifically legitimate risk-based parameters.

The minimal level of RF-EMF that has produced a biologic effect is around 1.7 V/m. A body of evidence supports reducing current limits to a peak value of 6 V/m – as a minimal level that may reduce health risks.[27]

Other countries have stricter standards which demand that cumulative emissions do not exceed the standard:[28] [29]

Switzerland (ORNI Regulation): applies ‘installation limits’ with a limit of 4–6 V/m in locations with prolonged exposure (homes, schools, hospitals). Swiss standards are cumulative for all stations affecting a site.
Italy (Framework Law 36/2001): sets a 6 V/m limit for all living environments (indoor and outdoor). This applies across the full 100 kHz–300 GHz band. Italy’s rule targets ‘sensitive areas’ and cumulative exposure, with no allowance for exceedance even short-term. Local authority measures do exist.
Belgium (Brussels/Wallonia): A zoned approach where regional governments apply varying limits: 3–6 V/m typically near schools, hospitals, and residential zones. The strictest are in Brussels (3 V/m for combined emissions). Municipalities often display antenna maps, requiring pre-installation public notice, and in some cases enforce setback policies.[30]
Russia (SanPiN standards): Takes into account non-thermal effects. 10 µW/cm² ≈ ~6.1 V/m. Cell towers and antennas explicitly prohibited on school grounds and children’s facilities.[31]

Neither society nor governments can expect exposures to have a benign effect on body systems. Insurance companies have recognised the inherent risks and draft in electromagnetic field exclusions in insurance policies, including for non-ionizing radiation exposures. Insurance companies recognise the long-tail nature of these risks – characterised by a long-latency and uncertainty.

A huge body of scientific evidence tells us that exposures are not benign, but harmful. Vertebrate bodies have not altered (or calibrated) in the past hundred years, to account for the increased orders of magnitude levels, of densification of non-native EMF-RF emissions in the surrounding environment.

The Ministry of Health and ICNIRP do not methodically account for the complexities of densified RF-EMF environments, including highly localized intensity peaks, pulsed emissions, and the cumulative contribution of background radiation from multiple personal and infrastructure-based sources. No formal public assessment addresses the chronic, low-level, multisource exposure or the health relevance of peak intensities and modulation patterns.

The concentration of RF-EMF in certain areas — forming zones of constructive field overlap and spatial heterogeneity — remains unassessed. PSGR remains deeply concerned about the biological plausibility of harm from time-varying exposures: asynchronous signals from technologies such as 4G, 5G, and Wi-Fi generate pulsing and modulation patterns that may have effects even where average power densities remain within current guidelines. There is growing evidence linking such exposures to oxidative stress, altered calcium ion signalling, and disruptions to melatonin regulation.

Scientists faced barriers to research exploring and reporting the biological effects of RF power densities less than 10 mW/cm2. In New Zealand, science on RF-EMF is unlikely due to the current policies that are in place by the Ministry of Business, Employment and Innovation. Current science policies reflect MBIE’s innovation focus, and stewardship, basic research and monitoring is not a priority of MBIE.[32]

Historically, agencies tasked with caring for environment and human health would hold powers of stewardship of man-made technologies. However, in New Zealand, business-facing MBIE, as we have discussed, secured control of telecommunications RF-EMF National Environmental Standards for Telecommunication Facilities regulations. Unauthored reports by a secretive Ministry of Health (MoH) committee then provide the justification for retaining 1999 standards in MBIE’s regulations.

PSGR do not believe that MBIE is the appropriate body to steward these regulations. PSGR do not consider that MoH papers form any approximation of scientifically rigorous review.

PSGR consider that the New Zealand population is poorly served by the current governance framework.

The tens of thousands of published papers on the health effects of non-native EMF-RF produce a weight of evidence or a burden of proof. The weight of evidence on risk does not require to be ‘balanced out’ by the evidence of safety, like a game of noughts and crosses. Ethics-based judgement by officials and scientists requires them to categorically protect health. Research demonstrating harm has frequently been undertaken by independent institutions who are not aligned with industry groups or engaged in research on radiation development for medical, military or other purposes.

There are different scientific approaches to understanding whether a technology is harmful. A policy-relevant, science-based approach involves, firstly, an appreciation of daily to lifetime exposures: the breadth (from different devices), duration (from seconds to all day) and extent (from lowest levels to pingback beams between towers and devices).

Secondly, a policy-relevant, science-based approach requires a methods-based evaluation of the existing scientific literature of risk and harm, from mechanistic data to case studies. It involves scrutinising pathways of potential risk to vulnerable populations – pregnant women, infants, children and adolescents, and hypersensitive populations.

A policy-relevant approach involves recognising that there is no known threshold where harm starts. This does not mean there is no evidence of risk or harm – but no evidence for safety.

Harm from environmentally relevant non-native RMF-RF exposures to a developing infant, like the particles emitted from a combustion engine, or the formulation of a chemical in a workplace, cannot be discretely parsed. As with any acute or chronic environmental exposure that disrupts homeostasis, latency, the delay between exposure and disease can occur over years and decades and is inconsistent across people. Hence, an appreciation of the weight, or strength of the evidence is central to any discussion if it is to ethically involve the protection of human and environmental health.

Safeguarding human and environmental health is a fundamental duty of government. Yet under current RF-EMF governance frameworks and regulatory settings in New Zealand, this duty is not, and cannot be, fulfilled.

This article is drawn from PSGR's larger paper:

PSGRNZ (2024) Stepping Back from the Brink: The Programmable Ledger. Four democratic risks that arise when Digital IDs are coupled to Central Bank Digital Currencies. Chapter 8. An Influence Web. Bruning, J.R., Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand. ISBN 978-0-473-71618-9.

The Stepping Back from the Brink paper outlines the democratic risk presented by digital ID and CBDC currencies. The problem of regulatory capture concerns not just a Reserve Bank that defers to a conflicted management consultancy to develop policy, but more broadly reflects the risks of government agencies and regulators when they are faced with highly resourced industries that seek to achieve and maintain market access for their technologies and substances.

AN INFLUENCE WEB: REGULATORY CAPTURE

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes. "Who will guard the guards themselves?"

The absence of domestic academics researching the constitutional dilemma of regulatory capture in New Zealand might help explain why no academic or legal experts have yet considered the potential for undue corporate industry influence when it comes to policy and regulation of CBDCs, Digital IDs, and the relationships therein. The classic explanation of regulatory capture is[1]:

‘the process through which special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as diverse as the setting of taxes, the choice of foreign or monetary policy, or the legislation affecting R&D. According to the narrow interpretation, regulatory capture is specifically the process through which regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state agencies that are supposed to control them.’

The classic model outlined by George Stigler presumes that regulatory capture involves incentives provided to a single regulator where:

‘regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.’[2]

This includes the revolving door problem, where people move between industry and government; and the problem of strategic influence where over time, generations of regulator-firm overlap and interdependencies can shift the regulator closer to the regulated industry, resulting in ‘too much’ of an incentive to co-operate.[3]

Consider the questionable ‘revolving-door’ practice where the regulated become the regulator. In 2019 Christian Hawkesby commenced as assistant governor for economics, financial markets and banking. Hawkesby had been part of a team which established Harbour Asset Management, which is owned by Jarden Wealth and Asset Management. [4] [5]

Public understanding of regulatory capture has changed in both scope and influence. Regulatory capture can occur via expertise and/or political lobbying through broader mechanisms which are not necessarily directed to a single regulator. Industry experts can lead, control and shape the design of policy to influence the policy decisions of governments regulatory authorities. In recent years scholars and researchers have drawn attention to the role of corporate industries in influencing nation state policy through the supply of expertise, through informational literature, communications and networking processes.[6]

Industry representative groups frequently take steps to develop a policy and informational narrative that reflects and supports their desired trajectory and business aims. Repeated interactions with the regulated industry have been described as cognitive or cultural capture, with the effect that regulators think like the industry. The threat posed by regulatory legislation can dissolve as regulations reflect private sector, rather than public sector interests and values, while industry can point to the legitimacy of the regulations that they ‘agree’ to.[7]

Industry influence and power has consolidated through globalisation, lobbying and networking, through the supply of private sector services and expertise, and the increasing adoption of private sector values inside governments and the influence of global management consultancy firms. Corporations exercise their political agency through political engagement, institutional participation, and provision and production of resources and services.[8] [9]

Industry funding is used to supply hard infrastructure, including conference and meeting premises to support elite networks and promote collegial relations and ensure access by industry leaders and firms to public officials.[10] However these industry organisations also provide the soft infrastructure – global and domestic thinktanks, communications and policy development researchers to shape political debate.

The consequence is a complex web of influence that extends far beyond the power of individual citizens. This is how stakeholder conversations concerning the adoption of technologies occur at pace behind doors, setting values and principles, language and framing. It’s simply business that industries use their resources to secure take-up by nation-states.

Industries will imagine, encourage and incentivise new roles for technology inside governments and then take action to ensure that government policy and resourcing decisions make a space for private industry-developed resources and services. This is good business practice.

John Finch and colleagues have suggested three processes used to stymy environmental regulation: industry groups formulating regulatory principles, operationalising these principles through technical documentation and calculation, and incremental innovation inside industry sectors to address the problems faced by industry regulators.[11]

Scholars argue that such strategies are not separate from the broader operations of industries, but integrated and centrally directed. ‘Corporations seek to dominate the information and decision-making environments to pursue their interests’, they achieve this by not merely influencing policy but through the co-creation and delivery of policy. The consequence for governments is that:

‘governance is a matter not simply of power or struggle but of communication, ideas and ideology.’ [12]

In 2022 Andrea Saltelli and colleagues summarised these processes as a range of tactics used by industry lobbyists to influence the way governments think about scientific and technical knowledge.

Three stages are suggested. Industry agents (lobbyists) influence the methods by which the policy-relevant evidence is produced. They then delegitimise or appropriate the role of the institutional settings which produce the evidence. Through these processes they change the:

‘the framework or the worldview, to the effect of removing those elements of regulation and evidence which are seen as undesirable by the private interests.’[13]

Fintech industries, and perhaps even the BIS, can be envisaged as democratic ‘erosion agents’ who purposefully drive institutional change and hence, the regime transformation. These are actors with agency – Marianne Kneuer considers that they are able to act on three conditions requiring:

the power to change the rules of the game;
the intention to change the rules of the game; and
the ability to organize relevant groups of followers to change the rules of the game.[14]

Kneuer notes:

‘erosion agents try to fly below the radar as long as possible – they avoid hard and open repression of citizens as well as the massive limitation of political rights, instead relying more on loopholes, selective and event-driven measures, and subtle control.’ [15]

Where stakeholder consultation has taken place it has been secretive and confined. With regards to Digital ID and CBDC policies the principles and frameworks might be claimed to arise from ‘stakeholder consultation’. The DIA and RBNZ have intensively engaged in stakeholder consultation with small groups of stakeholders that appear to disproportionately contain industry actors and marginalised communities while being unavailable to the general public.[16] [17] They’ve then created principles that reflect the stakeholder engagement, but which also mirror industry derived principles[18]. Industry groups often lead by establishing principles that are then adopted by nation states, as is discussed below.

However, as discussed, stakeholder consultations for the Digital Identity Services Trust Framework Bill (which sets up a governance framework for the corporations that use digital identity or provide technical services) broadly excluded the general public. The government framed Digital ID stakeholders as the public agencies who would have oversight over the greater digital infrastructure, the private sector industries who would supply the Digital ID technologies and services, and a minor group representing Māori interests.

The Digital ID framework policy-framing and legislation, and the April 2024 CBDC white papers mirror priorities, pre-prepared principles and discursive narratives already preprepared in white papers prepared by the Central banks, transnational consultancy firms and industry-funded non-government organisations.

Perhaps cultural capture has resulted in a necessary achievement. Prima facie, it is not Parliament or The Treasury that appear to have responsibility for deciding whether the RBNZ should issue a digital currency – it is the RBNZ appear to have granted themselves this power, through their control of framing, risk assessment and discourse. The institutional setting has been appropriated.

These tactics, by directly targeting the societal functions of science, have effectively reshaped the social, ethical and cultural attitudes to policy making in favour of the Fintech industries and agencies who favour greater surveillance of citizens.[19]

Saltelli et al (2022) describe this as a two-pronged approach:

‘The first prong is a substitution of collusive activities, by removing the traditional separation between regulators and regulated. This process is built on ‘institutional carriers’ such as official statements and normative and ethical principles, stated by document agreed upon by different stakeholders. This allows for a formally neutral and legitimate conduit of industrial interests.’

Once these processes are in place, the regulator and regulated relationship is supplanted by a relationship of mutual support and through this process the governments’ values are captured and reframed -

‘The second prong is a process of reframing and rescaling values and the vision of the relationship among science, society and politics.’

Government discourse around ‘inclusion’, previously discussed, imitates the broader, global messaging, and fails to appreciate the perspective indigenous populations might have if they were asked to consider the harsh reality of increased control through Digital IDs and CBDC ledger technologies, of panopticon-like surveillance.

The global Fintech industry have embedded themselves in domestic surveillance and banking policy through their leadership in the development of Digital IDs and CBDC policy and infrastructure. It’s easy to be unaware of, and dismiss, the long-term collegiality; overlapping relationships; and ongoing crosstalk that has occurred for years between the World Economic Forum and the Bank of International Settlements[20], and the International Monetary Fund[21]. The World Economic Forum:

‘is mostly funded by its 1,000 member multi-national companies.[22]

Then there are the ‘top 100 strategic partners’ of the World Economic Forum (WEF), which include the dominant players in the Fintech system and all of the major consultancy firms that governments habitually bring in to government agencies to develop policy and oversee campaigns. The mission of the WEF states:

‘The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. It provides a global, impartial and not-for-profit platform for meaningful connection between stakeholders to establish trust, and build initiatives for cooperation and progress.

In a world marked by complex challenges, the World Economic Forum engages political, business, academic, civil society and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas.’

These WEF Strategic Partners are corporations, not governments, and they:

‘believe in the power of collaboration to drive positive change, and work closely with the World Economic Forum to help shape industry, regional and global agendas’. [23]

The Fintech sector and the individuals in the DIA and RBNZ who are dedicated to locking policies and law in place have another advantage. The technologies involved in Digital IDs and CBDCs are so new that they are not well-studied. Therefore, the political ramifications are not well known. The potential to undermine human, civil and constitutional rights have not been fleshed out by constitutional and administrative law experts.

The Fintech sector, the government actors who are committed to the policy, and the global management consultancies who network across government, Fintech and the World Economic Forum stand to benefit from the novelty of this process. It’s not surprising then, that as their power and influence is growing and as governance arrangements in favour of greater Fintech power are advancing at pace, trust in the tech sector is commensurately declining at pace.[24]

It is difficult not to see that the RBNZ, together with its policy co-developer Accenture, are conflicted, and unable to stand back and consider the broader digital ecosystem with any impartiality, and the policy documents suggest this.

Backing out of CBDC issuing powers may be extraordinarily difficult, as Central banks and the huge Fintech industry will use their financial and political influence to prevent what they would view as inappropriate regulation. Once policies and legislation are in place, if public opinion, or the social and scientific literature start to express concern about risk that might result in regulation, a large body of literature demonstrates that industry sectors double-down and invest in product defence.

RBNZ’s already close relationship with Accenture suggest that if negative or worrying information is revealed as CBDC infrastructure develops, that the RBNZ will be reluctant to step back. The RBNZ may be so immersed in BIS and Fintech culture, it may struggle to consider the problem from a constitutional or public interest perspective.

Dr David Michaels, Professor at George Washington University, has described industry’s legacy not as a product, but rather, the legacy is based on the success in maintaining public belief, and hence regulatory concern, on how safe or effective a product. Industries legacy is in product defence.

Dr David Michaels, former head of the U.S. workplace regulator, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration considers that product defence distorts the capacity for governments to act in the best interests of the public.

‘The basic principle of the regulatory system holds that decisions must be made on the basis of the best evidence available at the time. Product defense science doesn’t just game our free-market system; it prevents our government from accomplishing one of the reasons for its very existence. It is often unrecognised because it is so ingrained in our understanding that a primary government function is to facilitate some individuals (including the owners of corporations) to benefit by producing or performing something that does not impinge on the freedom and well-being of other individuals… We want stronger regulations not because we don’t care about freedom, but because we cannot be free without the states protection from harm.’[25]

Constitutional and administrative law and human rights experts, for example, who might consider the broader infrastructure of overlapping Digital ID-CBDC relations, and the implications for the public, were not included in stakeholder conversations, and certainly haven’t drafted any publications which suggest they have had access and insight into these frameworks, and the legislation that supports the regulations.

The effect has been to move governance models to more broadly reflect private sector values of innovation and efficiency, altering the political agency of Western governments. Academic institutions have reflected this priority change (the neoliberal turn) following government shifts in policy and research funding trajectories.[26] This has created information asymmetries, reducing the pool of public law, social science and ethics experts that might critically analyse the implications of close government relations, regulatory capture and the implications for representative democracies. The informational gap has increased the potential for governments to lean on industry expertise.

REFERENCES

[1] Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: A review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22, 203–225. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj013

[2] Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160

[3] Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: A review.

[4] Acknowledged in 2022 address: Prior, M. (2022) Our Transformation as a Prudential Regulator. A speech delivered to the Financial Services Council in Auckland on 22 September 2022 Address by Christian Hawkesby, Deputy Governor and General Mananger Financial Stability. https://www.bis.org/review/r220922a.pdf

[5] Business Desk, People Explorer. https://businessdesk.co.nz/people/christian-hawkesby Accessed April 19, 2024.

[6] Saltelli A. et al (2022). Science, the endless frontier of regulatory capture. Futures 135:102860 DOI 10.1016/j.futures.2021.102860

[7] Kwak, J. (2013). Cultural capture and the financial crisis. In Daniel Carpenter, & David A. Moss (Eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it (Vol. 9781107036, pp. 71–98). Cambridge University Press.

[8] Farnsworth, K; Holden, C (2006) The Business-Social Policy Nexus: Corporate Power and Corporate Inputs into Social Policy. Journal of social policy, 35 (3). pp. 473-494. ISSN 0047-279

[9] Lewis N, Baker T, Prince R. (March 13 2023) The real problem is consultants' influence, not their cost. Newsroom. https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/03/13/the-real-problem-is-consultants-influence-not-their-cost/

[10] Scott, J. (1991), Who Rules Britain, Oxford: Polity Press.

[11] Finch J et al (2017). Captured by technology? How material agency sustains interaction between regulators and industry actors. Research Policy 46 (2017) 160–170, DOI 0.1016/j.respol.2016.08.002

[12] Miller D. and Harkins C. (2010). Corporate strategy, corporate capture: Food and alcohol industry lobbying and public health. Critical Social Policy, 0261-0183 101; Vol. 30(4): 564–589;376805. P.582 DOI: 10.1177/0261018310376805

[13] Saltelli A. et al (2022). Science, the endless frontier of regulatory capture. Page 9.

[14] Kneuer, M. (2021). "Unravelling democratic erosion: Who drives the slow death of democracy,

and how?" Democratization 28(8), 1442-1462 [Abstr. 72.1651].

[15] Kneuer, M. (2023). Trends on Democratic Erosion: The Role Of Agency And Sequencing. International Political Science Abstracts, 73(6), 837-847. Page 845. https://doi.org/10.1177/00208345231218076

[16] Department of Internal Affairs. Regulatory Impact Statement: Additional policy decisions for the Digital Identity Services Trust Framework Bill https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/detailed-policy-for-the-digital-identity-trust-framework/$file/RIS-Additional-policy-decisions-for-the-Digital-Identity-Services-Trust-Framework.pdf

[17] RBNZ CDC Forum Members. https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/oias/2024/oia2324-050-part4-information-about-the-cbdc-stakeholder-engagement-forum.pdf

[18] Bank of International Settlements (2020) Central bank digital currencies: foundational principles and core features. Report no 1 in a series of collaborations from a group of central banks. https://www.bis.org/publ/othp33.pdf

[19] Saltelli A. et al (2022). Science, the endless frontier of regulatory capture. Page 9.

[20] World Economic Forum. Search. https://www.weforum.org/search/?query=bank+of+international+settlements

[21] World Economic Forum. Search https://www.weforum.org/search/?query=international+monetary+fund

[22] Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Economic_Forum

[23] WEF. Strategic Partners. https://www.weforum.org/communities/strategic-partnership-b5337725-fac7-4f8a-9a4f-c89072b96a0d/

[24] Edelmans Trust Barometer. Trust in Tech Sector 2012-2021. https://www.edelman.com/trust/2021-trust-barometer/trust-technology

[25] Michaels, D. (2020). The Triumph of Doubt. Oxford University Press. P.271

[26] Bruning J. (2021) Innovation and Ignorance: How Innovation Funding Cultures Disincentivise Endocrine Disruption Research. Thesis. Master of Arts (Sociology). University of Auckland. https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/57929

New Zealand charity seeks public inquiries to investigate the conduct of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) and the responsible Minister, the Hon Judith Collins in their undertaking of Gene Technology Regulatory reform and Science System reforms.

PRESS RELEASE: Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand (PSGR). (PDF)

April 16, 2025.

A New Zealand charity, the Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand (PSGR), has reviewed official documents involved in the production of the Gene Technology Bill and New Zealand’s recent science system reforms and have published two white papers that call for two separate public inquiries.

PSGR have written to the Ombudsman asking that they convene a public inquiry to assess whether officials directly undermined public law conventions and processes to pursue policies and laws in favour of the deregulation of gene editing technology. PSGR have emailed members of Parliament to advise them of the complaint to the Ombudsman.

Secondly, PSGR are also calling for a ‘transparent and public inquiry’ that can (a) identify the factors leading to the collapse of the capacity of New Zealand’s research, science, innovation and technology system to be adequately resourced to meet the objectives of society at large; and (b) recommend how to transform it into having that capacity, and in doing so serve the public purpose and support the wellbeing of New Zealand, her people, resources and environment.

PSGR is open on the issue of whether the second, science system enquiry should be a formal inquiry or a Royal Commission but believes that people should be asking why the important role of science and research in producing knowledge for the maximum benefit of society, has been perverted by prioritising commercial returns.

PSGR have published two papers under the title: ‘When powerful agencies hijack democratic systems.’ The papers allege that government documents suggest that the Minister and MBIE officials may have acted to drive policy and legislative outcomes in a manner which may be neither fair nor impartial, but biased and potentially misleading. MPs have been sent these papers and advised of the complaint to the Ombudsman.

PSGR are concerned that officials may have sidelined and undermined important issues and conventions that are essential to sustain a robust, healthy, accountable democratic nation-state, in their haste to push through gene technology and science system reforms.

Lead researcher Jodie Bruning stated:

‘Evidence points to these reforms severely restricting the capacity of the new gene technology regulator, and the New Zealand science system, to conduct activities intended to serve the public good and supporting constitutional and democratic government.’

The Part I paper, The case of gene technology regulatory reform, recommends that the Gene Technology Bill is placed on hold and that the Ombudsman undertakes a formal review into the official conduct of MBIE and Judith Collins, to establish whether this body of officials directly undermined public law conventions and processes to pursue policies and laws in favour of the deregulation of gene editing technology.

Co-author and former Crown Research Institute researcher, Dr Elvira Dommisse stated:

‘The evidence suggests that the MBIE- funded Royal Society undertook research to communicate the benefits of new gene editing technologies, and used them to provide ideas for law reform. The National Party then took these recommendations and ran with them. MBIE and Judith Collins subsequently oversaw the drafting of legislation that excluded a wide range of these technologies from their proposed Bill. However, at no stage was there any formal process of assessing the risks of these excluded technologies.'

This is of particular concern because if the Bill were passed, these technologies could be ramped up commercially, and released at scale. No-one would know’

PSGR are concerned that if members of Parliament (MPs) believe MBIE’s assurances that the legislation is fit for purpose, that they may be being misled. There has been little or no scientific evaluation to assure MPs that the risks can ever be managed in such a way that will fulfil the purpose of the Bill, which is to ‘protect the health and safety of people; and the environment’.

The Part II paper, The case of science system reform, draws upon official documents to show how the science system reforms that are currently underway (2023-2024) have excluded any evaluation of the role of public good research in meeting the objectives of society at large. Instead, the current reforms will likely direct the RSI&T system away from optimising science and research to solve domestic problems and challenges.

Lead researcher Jodie Bruning stated:

‘MBIE officials know very well that ‘innovation’ is a proxy term for patents. They’ve directed the entire science system to promise a patent first, and then if we’re lucky this might trickle down into some other benefit. It’s the wrong way round. New Zealand has a very big problem when the Ministry responsible for innovation and economic growth controls the science system.’

The papers point to the extraordinary conundrum New Zealand is in. The conflict-of-interest which arises when the agency for economic growth, which controls the policy and funding for the entire science system, then takes action to secure control of legislative reforms that would reduce regulatory barriers to the very ‘innovations’ or technologies that that agency directly funds scientists to produce.

Jodie Bruning added that:

‘We’ve got an instance where one Ministry has extraordinary political and financial conflicts of interest, while also exercising effective control over how and what knowledge is produced for New Zealand as a nation. When that Ministry secured that massive control of the science system, it did not achieve this through an Act of Parliament, but via secondary legislation. This is an untenable situation for our science and research system, for the New Zealand people, and for our elected members.’

END.

For inquiries please email:

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The Hijacking Democracy papers (released April 2025):

PSGR (2025) When powerful agencies hijack democratic systems. Part I: The case of gene technology regulatory reform. Bruning, J.R., Dommisse, E.. Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand. ISBN 978-1-0670678-0-9

PSGR (2025) When powerful agencies hijack democratic systems. Part II: The case of science system reform. Bruning, J.R.. Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand. April 2025. ISBN 978-1-0670678-1-6

Download

The biotechnology industry has exerted an enormous global push from approximately 2016 to the current date, to guide regulatory agencies to believe that if a genetically modified organism (GMO) is gene edited but does not contain a detectable novel protein/s or detectable novel DNA, that that GMO is 'substantially equivalent' or comparative to a conventionally or naturally bred organism and does not require regulation. These sorts of gene edited GMOs are called by various names: new genomic techniques - NGTs (EU), new breeding techniques - NBTs (Australia and New Zealand) and new plant varieties (U.S.). Many of these new terms make it difficult to tell that the organism has been modified (gene edited). I.e. it would not only not be regulated, but it would also not be labelled or tracked as a GMO. The global push in Australia and New Zealand is multi-pronged, at minimum incorporating:

Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) P1055, August/September 2024 proposal to amend the definitions for 'food produced using gene technology' and 'gene technology' in the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (the Code). (PSGR's response)
Evidence that the biotechnology industry is meeting and working with government sectors to secure greater access through bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (which the public do not have access to).
MBIE's proposed Gene Technology Bill which would deregulate these organisms in New Zealand, potentially ensuring that NZ would have one of the weakest jurisdictions in the world. (Discussed in PSGR's February 2025 Bill submission and further illustrated in our April 2025 Report).

These Australia and New Zealand agencies have not:

1. conducted formal risk assessment to methodically analyse whether their claims that the NBTs are as benign as claimed are correct. PSGR show that: a. FSANZ fail to do this work. FSANZ instead, like a babushka doll, drafted white paper after white paper to build the 'case' or the 'fact' that the NBT is the same - however they never evaluated the scientific literature; and as well - b. MBIE never undertook the work to evaluate the risk in the scientific literature to be able to uphold their claim that the NZ proposed legislation would be 'risk proportionate' as they claimed.

2. Taken any step to consider their obligation to the public, to ensure that the public can know whether the food they are consuming is a GMO (i.e. is gene edited) or not.

The idea that GM/GE plants might not be transparently identified, i.e., not tracked and traced, is unethical as studies consistently demonstrate that people - from France, USA, Japan, Russia, China to Vietnam prefer not to consume GMO food and will pay a premium for GMO. The push is unethical as it also obfuscates knowledge about whether a technology is worthy, whether that technology creates broader risks, or whether that technology should be abandoned. The farmers that are growing the product can't know if it is a brand-new untested variety or an old and trusted variety. It wouldn't be labelled.

This is - let's just call it outrageous - when one considers the purpose of the FSANZ Act 1991 on top of consistent scientific research that shows that the public continue to reject GMO foods. I.e. people actively want transparency - the very thing, that the Act is in place to achieve.

September 2024: FSANZ P1055 2nd Consultation proposal to deregulate (perhaps up to 94%) of GMOs by changing the definition - FSANZ Submission PDF or scrollable on Substack. We consider that mainstream media have inadequately discussed the biosecurity risk presented by scalable GMO technology. Worryingly, neither Australian or New Zealand media discussed the P1055 FSANZ consultation to inform the public that a 'paradigm shift' in GMO/GE regulation, from process-based to outcomes-based was being proposed by the food safety authority. If the public do not know, they cannot comment.

February 2025: Submission to the Health Select Committee on the Gene Technology Bill 2024. PSGR’s submission is in two parts (PDF):

Part I: Deficient Policy Formulation: details ways in which the Bill’s drafters have drafted text to narrowly restrict Regulatory powers and prevent wider regulatory scrutiny. This not only leaves New Zealand vulnerable to slow moving problems, it would result in the Regulator having insufficient scope and inadequate information in emergency situations that would enable the Regulator to assure the health and safety of people.
Part II: Recommendations including critical analysis of Bill text: Makes in-depth recommendations and outlines problems and gaps in the Bill text.

March 2025: Presentation to the Health Subcommittee, on behalf of the Physicians and Scientists for Global Responsibility (PSGR) (2:30:00-2:40:00). PSGR’s presentation concerned the Gene Technology Bill that is currently before that select committee.

April 2025: Release of paper - PSGR (2025) When powerful agencies hijack democratic systems. Part I: The case of gene technology regulatory reform. Bruning, J.R., Dommisse, E.. Physicians & Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand. ISBN 978-1-0670678-0-9

PSGR also emailed Members of Parliament (see also accompanying press release)- because:

'PSGR believe that there is significant evidence that actions of the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (MBIE) officials and the Minister in charge, Judith Collins may have undermined good process to drive outcomes that would severely restrict the capacity of the new gene technology regulator to safely regulate gene edited technologies and organisms.'

With the evidence that the policy process was deficient and could not be considered to conform with Treasury guidelines, PSGR emailed New Zealand's Chief Ombudsman to request a formal Inquiry. However, this was rejected by the Ombudsman on the basis that PSGR had no personal interest (see our correspondence here).

There is evidence that most gene edited organisms could evade pre-market risk assessment and avoid being labelled a GMO/GE product. A European study showed that 94% of current GM/GE plant applications affected by the European GE (new genomic techniques) proposal would not be classified as a GMO. For more information, please scan our Fact Checking 101 page and consider reading our 2023 review paper which outlines where New Zealand stands currently on biotechnology and gene editing.

New Zealand has a low tolerance for unwanted and invasive species. Wilding or volunteer GMO species are a massive problem in north and south America. It is not easy to estimate how highly scalable GMO technologies could themselves become a biosecurity risk for future generations. This was not considered in FSANZ 2024 consultation, and we are yet to see a risk assessment for the gene technology reform process by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, who are currently attempting to deregulate many gene editing techniques and organisms.

If you think it is 'over the top' that PSGR state that MBIE are working to deregulate gene editing techniques and organisms, our recent paper PSGR (2025) When powerful agencies hijack democratic systems. Part I: The case of gene technology regulatory reform reveals how MBIE's problem definition, shown in their Regulatory Impact Statement was focussing on - not the safety of GMOs - but the deregulation of them. MBIE then commenced to use scientists they funded to produce GMOs and gene edited organisms, and people and organisms with biotech investments or partnerships to develop biotech - to act as the 'experts' for the consultation for the new regulations and laws.

PSGR's Hijacking Democracy paper (April 2025) shows the paper trail and reveals the extraordinary conflicts of interest at play.

PSGR Professor Jack Heinemann, Director of the Centre for Integrated Research in Biosafety (INBI); Tessa Hiscox and Andrew McCabe. Centre for Integrated Research in Biosafety (INBI), at New Zealand's University of Canterbury, & some of the co-authors of INBI's Submission to the Parliament Health Committee on the Gene Technology Bill 2024.: Proposed NZ Gene Tech Bill: Scientists say risk tiering framework is not risk proportionate 'scientific case is not made'.

'New Zealand would have the most extreme combination in the world of proposed species breadth (microorganisms, plants, animals) and process (e.g. SDN2) exemptions.'

Hundreds of epidemiological studies and meta-analyses have reported associations between ultra-processed food consumption and adverse health outcomes. The literature is increasing - the evidence - is pointing to the fact that poor diets with high levels of ultraprocessed foodstuffs, not only drive diabetes - but most illnesses that are common New Zealand. Ultraprocessed foods are low in bioavailable nutrients, frequently high in carbohydrates, and contain high levels of manmade chemicals and high levels of chemically refined (as opposed to naturally refined or cold pressed) vegetable oils. Synthetic chemicals and vegetable oils are recognised as drivers of inflammation, while refined carbohydrates (or starches) drive insulin resistance. Nutritionally bioavailable vitamins and minerals are critical to all body functions, often acting as important co-factors in critical biological processes, from growth, to sleep, to brain health (memory, cognition and resilience and positivity), to reproduction and energy. Low levels of vitamins and minerals, systemic inflammation and insulin resistance are commonly recognised drivers of chronic and communicable illnesses. When people are unwell with inflammation or an illness, they more rapidly vitamin and mineral levels.

PSGR have identified a worrying gap in New Zealand's health governance. The Public Health Agency was established in 2022 to guide health decision-making, including to advise the Director-General and the Minister of Health. As with all agencies operating under the Health Act 1956 (s3A), the PHA must work to improve, promote, and protect public health. The PHA are focussed on equity but are not focussed on dietary nutrition. There is information or advice that states that dietary nutrition is outside the scope of the PHA, however, dietary nutrition and diet and nutritional deficiency as a driver of chronic disease is not in the work programme of the PHA. This was further confirmed via four Official Information Act requests, made in December 2023, and answered in February 2024, to the key members of the Senior Leadership Team (at that time) that this work was not being undertaken:

An Expert Advisory Committee on Public Health (PHAC) was established (Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Act 2022 [s93]). The terms of reference for this Advisory Committee does not include any requirement to review dietary guidelines or nutrition standards (including to assess the literature on optimum levels of vitamins and minerals) and the position statement on Māori Health does not refer to diet and nutrition. Poor diets and sub-optimum nutrition are recognised drivers of risk for an extraordinary range of chronic and communicable disease, and poor diets will be more commonly experienced by low-socioeconomic groups.

There appears to be no other agency tasked with this responsibility, inside the Ministry of Health. The PHA in the role of advising the Director-General and Minister, and updating guidelines and regulations, should be reviewing best practice nutrition to increase knowledge on poor diets and nutrition, and to ensure that our regulations and guidelines do not drive disease but that they improve, promote, and protect public health, due to the regulations and guidelines being outdated. But this work is not being undertaken.

Drawing attention to poor diets, and sub-optimum nutrition is a big focus for PSGR.

We're looking for scientists and doctors to interview to support massive efforts already underway across New Zealand, working to bring this environmentally-driven sickness epidemic into public view in New Zealand. PSGR recently published a Substack article reviewing three groundbreaking books on the evidence that poor diets not only drive mental illness, but that dietary and nutritional changes can exert profound improvements in mental health.

We recently interviewed Professor Julia Rucklidge on amazing outcomes for high dose nutrients for pregnant mothers taking higher dose multinutrient formulations, where the nutrient levels are higher than (what appear to be) out-dated guideline and regulatory levels. We've previously interviewed Professor Ashley Gearhardt on how ultraprocessed foods likely meet the category for an addictive substance, and Dr Jen Unwin on reversing type-2 diabetes and the challenge of food addiction. We have also interviewed Dr Glen Davies on his work reversing type-2 diabetes, and we also interviewed Dr Emma Sandford on nutritional medicine and eye health, and how high carbohydrate diets are driving poor vision. We've also interviewed Dr Anna Goodwin on cancer and the role of diet and nutrition in not only supporting cancer recovery, but improving clinical treatment outcomes, which we published as a two-part series (Part 1 and Part 2).

In early 2024 academics from Australia, the US and France reviewed the evidence for diseases associations and ultraprocessed food across 45 meta-analyses. These meta-analyses covered some 10 million participants. Melissa Lane and colleagues identified direct associations between exposure to ultra-processed foods and health conditions which included mortality, cancer, and mental, respiratory, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and metabolic ill health. As the paper stated:

Overall, direct associations were found between exposure to ultra-processed foods and 32 (71%) health parameters spanning mortality, cancer, and mental, respiratory, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and metabolic health outcomes. Based on the pre-specified evidence classification criteria, convincing evidence supported direct associations between greater ultra-processed food exposure and higher risks of incident cardiovascular disease related mortality and type 2 diabetes, as well as higher risks of prevalent anxiety outcomes and combined common mental disorder outcomes. Highly suggestive evidence indicated that greater exposure to ultra-processed foods was directly associated with higher risks of incident all cause mortality, heart disease related mortality, type 2 diabetes, and depressive outcomes, together with higher risks of prevalent adverse sleep related outcomes, wheezing, and obesity.

Lane M M, Gamage E, Du S, Ashtree D N, McGuinness A J, Gauci S et al. Ultra-processed food exposure and adverse health outcomes: umbrella review of epidemiological meta-analyses BMJ 2024; 384 :e077310 doi:10.1136/bmj-2023-077310

WHAT ARE ULTRA-PROCESSED FOODS?

What contributes to my chronic condition? There is compelling evidence that diet is the main driver of health status.[i][ii] [iii] The last 30 years of gene science has demonstrated that while individuals may be predisposed to a genetic condition, it is predominantly environmental drivers, or stressors, that tip people into health or disease.

Stressors can be acute or chronic. If people are (acutely) exposed to large amounts of poison, trauma, stress and pollution bodies can reasonably quickly tip into with a long-term illness or condition. However, if people are exposed long-term to food that wouldn't cause harm if we had a little bit every now and then. However, if we are chronically exposed to poor diets that promote inflammation, insulin resistance and poor nutrition - people can also tip into a long-term illness or condition. Frequently, chronic exposures promote multimorbidity. Chronic conditions can include a metabolic illness, such as pre-diabetes and Type 2 diabetes, heart disease, cancer, chronic pain. But also mental illness, included depression, anxiety and many other brain-related conditions, that might have previously been regarded as exclusively a neurotransmitter problem.

When infants, children and young people consume 40-60% of their diets as ultraprocessed foods, they may be expected to tip into a range of conditions, earlier than their ancestors.

By contrast - if food is nourishing and health promoting, bodies and minds[iv] [v] - are more resilient. Resilience means people recover better from the challenges, and insults of daily life. Even after trauma - we return to healthy sleeping patterns more quickly.

There is increasing evidence (as we discuss here) - that healthy diets can reverse many chronic mental health conditions.

Traditional (historic) diets depended on what food-types were seasonally available a person's region, and what skills human ancestors had to prepare and store food over colder months. Today people are generally sicker at an earlier age with long-term ‘chronic’ diseases and diagnoses. Studies of cellular biology, nutrition, case studies and large analyses demonstrably pattern the origin of these diseases, all too frequently, to poor diets.

These are generically referred to as ‘lifestyle diseases’, but the way people and families consider, cook and consume food is influenced by cultural, historic, social and economic factors which shape knowledge and capacity.[vi] [vii] [viii] [ix] Health is part of a big picture.

Human ancestors did not consume ultra-processed foods which promoted insulin resistance and inflammation.

Ultra-processed foods (UPFs) are industrial formulations of processed food substances (oils, fats, sugars, starch, and protein isolates) that contain little or no whole food.[x] UPFs typically include flavours, colourings, emulsifiers, as well as other cosmetic additives to make them taste better.[xi] UPFs contain many more industrial ingredients than traditional, lightly processed foods such as cheese; tinned fruit, beans, and vegetables.

Monteiro, C.A., Cannon, G., Lawrence, M., Costa Louzada, M.L. and Pereira Machado, P. 2019. Ultra-processed foods, diet quality, and health using the NOVA classification system. Rome, FAO.

UPFS: MIXTURES OF REFINED INDUSTRIAL INGREDIENTS

How are UPFs different? UPFs deprive your body of complex nutrient mixtures. Formulation ingredients can be derived from a remarkably small range of ingredients. Manufacturers do add nutrients – but these cannot reflect the complex nutrient and fibre bioavailability of, for example, a single vegetable. When you eat lots of these foods, you can end up eating a narrow range of ingredients all day, just in different formulations. So, you don’t get the nutrients which are required to keep you humming along.

UPFs increase exposures to complex synthetic chemical mixtures.

These industrial formulations include synthetic chemicals, as well as genetically modified and chemically refined cereals and oilseeds. These additives are less likely to nourish us, and at times may harm us, and drive disease. These chemical mixtures are not assessed for risk, and the science to consider how mixtures might drive inflammation and drive disease, for example, is poorly funded, in comparison to science to drive drug development for those same diseases.

UPFs deprive the microbiome of complex fibre mixtures.

UPFs are ‘smoother’ and less challenging to eat than foods with fibre. This is a problem, because without healthy fibre, people can’t sustain a healthy gut microbiome. The human gut microbiome is ground zero for human health. Health journeys are personal because of job type, exercise level, genes; nutritional intake, age; gut health, gender; financial status, address and parents’ history. While stress always was part of life, human ancestors were not exposed to the range of environmental pollutant emissions that appear to reduce our resilience to stress, at younger and younger ages.

Cumulative lifetime environmental exposures – and humans' biological responses make up what is termed the ‘exposome’.[xii] Governments do not prioritise the monitoring and risk assessment of toxic exposures to synthetic chemicals, drugs, genetically modified foods, heavy metals and radiation. This can be undertaken through biomarker monitoring and testing, for example, of hair and serum. Monitoring, risk assessment and regulation lags behind the release of technologies onto the market.[xiii]

ADDICTIVE PROPERTIES ARE FREQUENTLY 'BUILT-IN' TO UPFS

Change is especially difficult when industrial food scientists build temptation into the industrial formulations. Industrial food formulations are frequently designed to make the UPF really, really tasty – hyper-palatable. Yes. Some foods possess addictive properties.[xiv] [xv] Scientists have theorised that refined carbohydrates trigger the addiction responses in ultraprocessed foods. They’re the addiction agent.[xvi] As people have more of an addictive substance our dopamine receptors down-regulate. The body digests and absorbs refined carbohydrates rapidly. We do the same with potatoes, particularly if they are peeled.

Refined carbohydrates include sugar, white flour and white rice. These foods are metabolised similarly in the body. Refined carbohydrates together add up to a glycaemic load. They make blood glucose rise quickly. Sugar is the worst culprit. When sugar consumption exceeds our liver’s capacity to clear and metabolise sugar, sugar ends up in the brain, driving reward. [xvii]

Ingredients in UPFs are traditionally low-cost. UPFs are specially designed for travelling long distances. They have to store well. UPFs are generally low in fibre, because fibre as an ingredient in food starts to break down, or go ‘off’. The food substances are often obtained from a few big high-yield crops (corn, wheat, soya, cane or beet). UPFs contain chemically refined, vegetable oils (such as canola, corn and soybean) rather than olive oil or coconut oil or butter, which are not chemically refined.

Corn and wheat might be synthesised into many different ‘ingredients’ - but the body is only consuming two food types. It is difficult for people on a high-wheat, high UPF diet to remain healthy over time.

As UPF exposures increase, industrial chemical exposures increase, while nourishing bioavailable nutrition & fibre decrease.

Change is never convenient when a person can’t sleep, when a person is hurt, fatigued and suffering.

Understanding these factors, and particularly, how addictive properties are embedded into the products, can create challenges to change, but also can help individuals and families reconsider things. This includes stopping blaming yourself, or the household cook, and realising that addiction is a product property to drive re-purchase. Addictive properties are critical to marketing. When individuals and families recognise that industrial commercial foods are cunningly designed for repurchase, this can help in the shifting of gears away from addiction-driven habits.

Often, it can be surprising that shifting the body away from food with addictive properties, is like any magnet. The pull is stronger in the short term, while over the long term, skills and strategies can be implemented, and new, body-habits nourished, to reduce that magnetic 'pull'. Withdrawal feelings are normal, and regression is normal, as prompts and triggers are embedded in daily life, from advertising signs to shops, to digital media.

Recognising that 'this is business' can help shift dietary habits (loyalty to a product) and purchase-decisions support your body, particularly the brain, with the safe and nutritious food human bodies really need. Many people are on similar journeys, and people find that they are not alone.

When governments don’t fund independent science, in the knowledge gap, the public can be sceptical of the safety claims of large, private companies. They can be aware of the advertising dollar in mainstream media, and the lack of focus on the addictive properties of UPFs - from toast to noodles to commercial fast food.

Key to this long journey, is becoming determined to relearn the skills of our ancestors.

Healthy diets can be remarkably cheap and simple to prepare.
As skills develop, cooking becomes efficient, planned, but also creative.
When addictive impulses are removed, and insulin levels are healthy - money can be saved, and snacks reduced, as the body doesn't have to negotiate fatigue and sugar spikes.
But like recovering from alcohol addiction - recovery is often best in community and group environments, to promote learning but also to gain support to navigate the daily hurdles that can drive .

REFERENCES

[i] Lane M M, Gamage E, Du S, Ashtree D N, McGuinness A J, Gauci S et al. Ultra-processed food exposure and adverse health outcomes: umbrella review of epidemiological meta-analyses BMJ 2024; 384 :e077310 doi:10.1136/bmj-2023-077310

[ii][ii] Lane MM et al (2020) Ultra-processed food and chronic non-communicable diseases: A systematic review and meta-analysis of 43 observational studies. Obesity Reviews. 22(3):e13146. doi: 10.1111/obr.13146.

[iii] González Olmo GM et al 2021. Evolution of the Human Diet and Its Impact on Gut Microbiota, Immune Responses, and Brain Health Nutrients 2021, 13, 196. https://doi.org/10.3390/nu13010196

[iv] Rucklidge JJ et al (2021) Nutrition Provides the Essential Foundation for Optimizing Mental Health. 6:1, 131-154, DOI: 10.1080/23794925.2021.1875342

[v] Martínez EE et al (2020) Effect of ultra-processed diet on gut microbiota and thus its role in neurodegenerative diseases. Nutrition 71:110609 doi.org/10.1016/j.nut.2019.110609

[vi] Venn et al (2017) Social determinants of household food expenditure in Australia: the role of education, income, geography and time. Public Health Nutrition: 21(5), 902–911 doi:10.1017/S1368980017003342

[vii] Daniel C. (2016) Economic constraints on taste formation and the true cost of healthy eating. Social Science & Medicine 148:34-41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.11.025

[viii] Neuwelt-Kearns C. (2021) The realities and aspirations of people experiencing food insecurity in Tāmaki Makaurau. Kotuitui: New Zealand J Soc Sci Online. https://doi.org/10.1080/1177083X.2021.1951779

[ix] Vandevijvere S et al (2021) Food cost and adherence to guidelines for healthy diets: evidence from Belgium. Eur J Clin Nutrition (2021) 75:1142–1151

[x] Monteiro, C.A., Cannon, G., Lawrence, M., Costa Louzada, M.L. and Pereira Machado, P. 2019. Ultra-processed foods, diet quality, and health using the NOVA classification system. Rome, FAO.https://www.fao.org/3/ca5644en/ca5644en.pdf

[xi] Monteiro CA, Cannon G, Levy RB, Moubarac JC, Louzada MLC, Rauber F et al (2019) Ultra-processed foods: What they are and how to identify them. Public Health Nutr 22(5):936–941

[xii] Karlsson et al (2020). Opinion. The human exposome and health in the Anthropocene. International Journal of Epidemiology, 2020, 1–12 doi: 10.1093/ije/dyaa231

[xiii] Persson L et al. (2022) Outside the Safe Operating Space of the Planetary Boundary for Novel Entities. Environmental Science & Technology 56 (3), 1510-1521 DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.1c04158

[xiv] Praxedes DRS et al (2022). Prevalence of food addiction determined by the Yale Food Addiction Scale and associated factors: A systematic review with meta-analysis. European Eating Disorders Review, 30:2;85-95 https://doi.org/10.1002/erv.2878

[xv] Moss, M. (2021) Hooked. Random House.

[xvi] Gearhardt AN & Schulte EM (2021). Is Food Addictive? A Review of the Science. Annu. Rev. Nutr. 2021. 41:387–410. P.393

[xvii] R.H. Lustig. “Fructose: It’s Alcohol without the “Buzz”,” Adv. Nutr. 4 (2013): 226.

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For over 20 years the Physicians and Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand Charitable Trust (PSGR) has produced reports and submitted to government Bills and Inquiries.

We’ve been extraordinarily busy over the past 2 years with our work.

This Update aims to inform members and colleagues – and act as a go-to summary of our recent work.

2022 UPDATE - PDF

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MOVING FORWARD 2022+

The PSGR recognise that the perspectives that have been expressed by the PSGR from 2020 onwards will not necessarily reflect the perspectives of all trustees and all members.

However, we sincerely hope that PSGR’s perspectives are more likely to reflect the perspectives of the majority of our membership and of collegial organisations – which represents a diverse quorum of inquiring minds.

We hope that we have demonstrated a consistency to our work, that reflects and upholds the principles reflected in 20 years of research, information communications and submissions to policy

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