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Publications & Resources

Ruakura

Ruakura, on the outskirts of Hamilton, is the largest of the AgResearch campuses. Research includes animal molecular biology (genomics and cloning), reproductive technologies, agricultural systems modelling, land management, dairy and meat science, food processing technology and safety, and animal behaviour and welfare.

AgResearch Limited

Ruakura Research Centre

East Street
Private Bag 3115
HAMILTON

Telephone +64 7 834 6600
Fax: +64 7 834 6640
Email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

The Hopkirk Research Institute

The Hopkirk Research Institute concentrates on health sciences for pastoral-fed animals. Its scientists work in association with Massey University on the University’s Turitea campus.

Hopkirk Research Institute

Tennent Drive
PALMERSTON NORTH 4442

Private Bag 11008
PALMERSTON NORTH 4442

Telephone +64 6 351 8600

Fax +64 6 353 7853

AgResearch Grasslands

AgResearch Grasslands is adjacent to Massey University, near Palmerston North, its research focus being plant breeding and plant molecular biology (particularly functional genomics), ruminant nutrition and land management.

Grasslands Research Centre
Tennent Drive
PALMERSTON NORTH 4442

Private Bag 11008
PALMERSTON NORTH 4442

Telephone +64 6 356 8019
Fax +64 6 351 8032

National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease

National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease (NCBID) is a collaboration between AgResearch and Biosecurity New Zealand, the Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) and AsureQuality.

National Centre for Biosecurity and Infectious Disease

AgResearch

Wallaceville Campus
Ward Street
WALLACEVILLE

PO Box 40063
UPPER HUTT 5140

Telephone +64 4 529 0300
Fax +64 4 529 0413

AgResearch Lincoln

AgResearch Lincoln, 15 km west of Christchurch, focuses on: biocontrol and biosecurity; plant breeding and seed technology; wool and skin biology; and animal fibres and textiles.

AgResearch Lincoln
Lincoln Research Centre

Cnr Springs Road and Gerald Street
LINCOLN

Private Bag 4749
CHRISTCHURCH 8140

Telephone +64 3 321 8800
Fax +64 3 321 8811

Molecular Biology Unit

Molecular Biology Unit (MBU) is in partnership with a Crown Research Institute (CRI), and the University of Otago, and combines agricultural and medical research to develop molecular tools for genome analysis.

AgResearch Molecular Biology Unit
Centre for Innovation

University of Otago
Cnr St David & Castle Streets
PO Box 56
DUNEDIN 9054

Telephone +64 3 479 7681
Fax +64 3 477 5413
Email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Invermay Agricultural Centre

Invermay Agricultural Centre is on the Taieri Plain, near Mosgiel and Dunedin. Its research concentrates on animal molecular biology, particularly genomics, deer, sheep, land management, and biocontrol and biosecurity.

Invermay Agricultural Centre
Puddle Alley
MOSGIEL 9092

Private Bag 50034
MOSGIEL 9053

Telephone +64 3 489 3809
Fax +64 3 489 3739

Paul G Butler, BSc, MB, ChB, Dip. Obst. (Auckland), FRNZCGP. General Practitioner. Region: Auckland

Jon Carapiet MA, MPhil, Senior Market Researcher. Region: Auckland

Bernard J Conlon, MB, BCh, BAO, DCH, DRCOG, DGM, MRCGP (UK), FRNZCGP. General Practitioner. Region:Whakatāne

Elvira Dommisse, BSc (Hons), PhD, Mus.B, LTCL, AIRMTNZ. Scientist, Crop & Food Research Institute (1985-1993), working on GE onion programme. Region: Canterbury.

Anna Goodwin, FRACP, FACNEM, FASLM. Dip Marine Biology and Seismology (UK). USA trained medical oncologist. Region: Bay of Plenty

Brian M Maskell, Strategist & development consultant (public and private sector). Region: Bay of Plenty

Frank Rowson, BVetMed Veterinarian. Region: Waikato

Damian Wojcik, BSc, MBChB, DipObst., DCH FIBCMT FACNEM FRNZCGP Master Forensic Medicine (Monash) FRCPA (Forensic). General Practitioner; Clinical Metal Toxicologist; Forensic Physician; Director, Northland Environmental Health Clinic. Region: Northland

Jodie Bruning, Sociologist. B.Bus.Agribusiness (Monash Australia); MA Sociol, Research, University of Auckland. www.TalkingRisk.NZ JRBruning.Substack.com Region: Bay of Plenty

Jodie Bruning is PSGRNZ's lead researcher and primary media contact.

Physicians and Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand Charitable Trust (NZ Charities no.CC29935) works with qualified researchers and volunteers who work to produce transparent, high quality science information to educate and inform the public.

Initially titled Physicians and Scientists for Responsible Genetics (PSRGNZ), the organisation was established by a group of medical and scientific professionals, who identified potential risks and uncertainty raised by the comparatively new technology of genetic engineering.

An initial concern lay with genetic engineering of crops. Members were concerned about the possible effects these crops could have on the environment and, through the introduction of new foods into the food-chain, the impact on human health.

Early expertise by qualified scientists were required to submit to the 2000/2001 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, and PSGR presented a number of expert witnesses in this field. Other submissions have subsequently been made as Applications to New Zealand's regulatory authorities.

PSRGNZ operated as a registered Charitable Trust until June 2008 when a name change was made to Physicians and Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand Charitable Trust (PSGR) to better address important objectives.

Scientists have recently recognised that the production and release of technologies - as Anthropogenic emissions - are fundamentally under-regulated, and this produces an existential global risk. Our work identifies recurring themes and regulatory processes that limit the capacity for governments and regulators to protect public and environmental health. For example, safety testing and data used in risk assessment for most technologies remains primarily supplied by the industry that seeks approval for the new technologies. Often many important considerations are excluded, such as the formulation of a product, and added issues relating to how the product is deployed, either into the environment or as a food or medical product.

PSGR have identified that a major barrier to knowledge is the difficulties public sector (non-industry aligned) scientists face in securing funding for science. Often funding schemes are poorly funded or not in scope, particularly if the science is interdisciplinary. Lawyers and the judiciary struggle with the complex socio-biological relationships, particularly where legal principles such as the Precautionary Principle have been sidelined and downplayed. This places policy-makers who must make decisions in the public interest in difficult positions, as they are required by law to be impartial and act to protect the health of the public, as well as our natural ecosystems. However they lack a deliberation pathway to act precautionarily.

Research into the safety of biotechnology and genetic modification continues. PSGR considers that biotechnology and new gene editing technologies (also referred to as many documents as ‘new breeding technologies’), requires ongoing regulation - transparency - as uncertainty prevails. New technologies scale quickly into the environment. While natural alterations in biology take decades and centuries, biotechnology can be released at global scale in less than 12 months. Transparency (sunlight) and regulation can help to manage this risk. Issues of unforeseen and unintended consequences remain. New technologies positioned as ‘precise’ appear instead, to be imprecise, raising further questions of risk (Latham 2016) (Heinemann et al 2013). Previously considered ‘safe’ traits appear not so safe (Then & Bauer-Panskus 2017).

CASE: BIOLOGY & GMOS

Regulators often keep complex issues at arms length. GMO crops released as field crops, predominantly have contained traits for insecticidal action or express herbicide resistance. These traits are usually ‘stacked’ to manage resistance, and to promote synthetic herbicide use in combination with the plant emitting a naturally produced insecticide. Regulators have not assessed the risk of the end-product as it reaches the public, complete with ongoing regimes of herbicide sprays consumed by the civil society (Latham et al 2017). Herbicide resistant biotechnology crops have resulted in increased rather than decreased pesticide usage, resulting in the production of superweeds. Earlier claimed buffer zones are inadequate to prevent cross-pollination (Hofman et al 2014). Issues such as risk from horizontal gene transfer remains outside risk assessment, yet potentially invasive (promiscuous) volunteer species can spread outside planting zones (Paull 2018) (Tang et al 2018). Questions relating to biopiracy arises when traits, such as drought tolerance which have arisen following decades of cultivation and cross-breeding are slightly altered and patented by a private firm. As more and more pastoral farmers recognise the importance of forage mixtures, might drought tolerant single species outcompete other species, effectively becoming an invasive weed? We also observe the failure to draw attention to issues of regional suitability, which is why farmers might breed one strain of wheat in a different temperate region from another; and the issues of yield returns, for example between herbicide tolerant species and naturally bred hybrids. However cost-benefit analyses have not taken steps to overlay, for example the adverse effect of pesticide spraying regimes, with longer term yield returns.

Biotechnology and gene edited organisms are one technology sector. The biotechnology sector has expanded significantly in the last 3 decades. Media may struggle to adopt a public interest stance, when communicating complex issues of science, ethics and biology. Looking into the future, the cultural and political difficulty governance bodies have with in keeping industry power at arms length and stewarding biotechnology safely, is reflected across a myriad of technologies. With the increasing incidence of cancer and chronic complex health conditions that are increasingly associated with technologies that are persistent, bioaccumulative and/or toxic, there are many opportunities to pivot stewardship of technology to protect public and environmental health.

NEW MEMBERS WELCOME

Members and associate members have provided significant expert scientific advice. We welcome new members with expertise and/or energy, who feel passionate about sharing evidence based, independent science. We also welcome members who might provide insight on how ethical and legal processes might be improved in order to improve deliberation and decision-making across expert communities.

REFERENCES

Heinemann JA, Massaro M, Coray DS, Agapito-Tenfen SZ, Wen JD. Sustainability and innovation in staple crop production in the US Midwest. Int J Agric Sustain. 2013:1–18

Hofman et al 2014. Maize pollen deposition in relation to distance from the nearest pollen source under common cultivation - results of 10 years of monitoring (2001 to 2010) 2014;26:24. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12302-014-0024-3

James C. Global status of commercialized biotech/GM crops: 2012. ISAAA; 2012. Available at: http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/44/download/isaaa-brief-44-2012.pdf

Latham, J. God’s Red Pencil? CRISPR and The Three Myths of Precise Genome Editing. April 25 2016.

Latham et al 2017. The distinct properties of natural and GM cry insecticidal proteins. Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering Reviews (2017) Vol. 33 , Iss. 1, 2017.

Paull J 2018. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) as Invasive Species. Journal of Environment Protection and Sustainable Development. 2018;4:3:31-37

Tang X et al (2018). A large-scale whole-genome sequencing analysis reveals highly specific genome editing by both Cas9 and Cpf1 (Cas12a) nucleases in rice. Genome Biology 19:84. https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-018-1458-5

Then & Bauer-Panskus 2017. Possible health impacts of Bt toxins and residues from spraying with complementary herbicides in genetically engineered soybeans and risk assessment as performed by the European Food Safety Authority EFSA. Environ Sci Eur. 2017; 29(1): 1.

9 February 2005

Food Standards Australia New Zealand
WELLINGTON

Submission on Application A549
Food derived from high-lysine corn LY038: to permit the use in food of corn genetically modified to produce high amount of lysine.

PSRG urges Food Standards Australia New Zealand to reject the above application. Corn products processed in Australia are likely to be supplied to markets in New Zealand and New Zealanders have the right to expect regulatory authorities to adopt a cautious approach to food safety and health considerations. On the grounds of human health and safety, PSRG believes that acceptance of this application is not warranted.

Considerations
(1) Research consistent with the WHO published protocols has not been carried out on the effect of novel proteins on humans, chickens or pigs, the intended recipients of this corn feed. The novel proteins are likely to arise both as a result of the DNA insertion event and also as a result of a higher amount of the amino acid lysine within the cell. To assume that the increase in lysine and the DNA insertion process will not result in considerable changes to the levels of primary or secondary metabolites in the cell shows little regard for food safety. Food allergies to any new proteins are a very important food safety issue and should be tested for as such on an on-going basis.
(2) The "inadvertent commingling" of conventional corn and LY038 would result in LY038 entering the human food supply. It would potentially affect every consumer and would be very difficult to trace.
(2a) Corn products are widely used in the production of processed foods and would therefore be widely consumed on a daily basis in multiple food products.

(3) In section 5.1 of A549 under "safety assessment," the initial assessment states that the "molecular characterization of the insert has been carried out." The assumption from this point is that the transgene will stay put and be completely stable. Professor Tony Conner, a GE researcher (Crop & Food), stated at the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol meeting in Christchurch last year that it was likely that in years to come we would not be able to detect transgenes with standard techniques such as PCR because they would "no longer be intact." This lack of stability is of major concern to scientists, particularly with respect to viral promoters (CaMV 35S) switching on dormant viruses and possibly oncogenes.
(3a) The molecular characterization is incomplete. The data presented does not definitively exclude the possibility that LY038 contains additional novel genes, derived either from the expression of fragments of inserted DNA or novel fusion proteins created at the junctions of inserted DNA and the maize genome.
(4) A549 (section 4) states that: "conventional corn-soy-based swine and chicken are characteristically deficient in lysine and require the addition of supplemental lysine for optimal animal growth and performance." Rather than engineering corn to produce more lysine, farmers of swine and chickens should avoid the health risks of GE feed to these animals and possibly humans consuming their meat. This can be done, as is already standard practice with organic farmers, by feeding the animals food that has sufficient natural levels of lysine for optimal growth. Similarly, they should limit the amino acid arginine in their diet, to help combat viral outbreaks.

(5) There have been no independent, long-term, peer-reviewed studies proving that the ingestion of any transgenic foods are safe for humankind. Nor has the US population – being the principle country releasing untested, unlabelled genetically engineered foods over a period of years - been monitored for any resulting effects of ingesting multiple transgenic foods on a continuous, daily, long-term basis. There has been no independent scientific study to see if there is a link or not between the two- to ten-fold increase in food-borne illnesses in the US (1994 to 1999) and the commercial release of transgenic crops there from the mid 1990s onwards. In Scandinavia, where genetically engineered foods have not been widely allowed in the food chain, the same statistics have remained virtually static. Nor has the US evaluated rates for cancers or other statistically monitored health problems since the introduction of genetically engineered foods.
(6) This corn is designed primarily for animal feed. The distribution of genetically engineered corn to US farms – following the rejection of genetically engineered corn by exports markets in Europe – brought reported adverse affects on stock. The markets are rejecting meat and meat products produced from animals that have consumed genetically engineered organisms.

PSRG supports a zero-tolerance level for genetically engineered organisms in foodstuffs. This is technically achievable.
PSRG supports an Identity Preservation traceability system being in place on all foodstuffs to ensure that labelling accurately reflects the presence or absence of food or food ingredients produced using genetic engineering technology. Mandatory to IP traceability would facilitate quality control, the verification of labelling claims, and the possible necessity of withdrawing products should unforeseen adverse effects to human health or the environment occur. It will also facilitate the monitoring of potential effects that genetically engineered organisms could have on human and animal health and the New Zealand environment.
PSRG supports mandatory fully detailed, accurate Country of Origin labelling for all packaged and unpackaged meat, fish, dairy produce, fruit and vegetables, be they in a whole form or as part of an ingredient or additive, or used in the production thereof.
PSRG supports full public disclosure of all information gathered by, or required to be gathered by, government on residues in foods whether they be from pesticides, herbicides or insecticides, heavy metals, industrial chemicals or their by-products, veterinary medicines and any other contaminants, at no cost to the public.
Such information is crucial in allowing New Zealanders to make informed purchasing decisions, and to meet the basic human rights of New Zealanders to know where food purchases originate.

(This submission has been prepared with the assistance of Dr Elvira Dommisse, BSc(Hons), PhD, a former GE scientist for DSIR/Crop & Food Research, Lincoln.)

PSRG will not present this submission in person.

Jean Anderson
Secretary
Physicians and Scientists for Responsible Genetics
www.psrg.org.nz

Ends

Physicians and Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand Charitable Trust

To educate the public concerning the risks of the release into the environment of genetically engineered organisms and to promote scientific research and analysis of those risks, and to educate the public on relevant matters of science and medicine.
To educate physicians and scientists about issues of science, medicine and technology, particularly those involving genetics.
To provide scientific and medical information and analysis in the service of the public’s right to be independently informed on issues concerning genetics, including genetic engineering and biotechnology, and other relevant matters of science and technology.
To encourage scientists and physicians to engage in public debate on issues of science, medicine and technology, particularly those involving genetics.
To co-operate with and support other organisations which are working towards the same goals as PSGR.
To educate physicians and scientists about the issues in science and technology and at present genetic engineering, that require independent professional advocacy of the precautionary principles.
To encourage scientist and physicians, as those members of our society who carry specialised knowledge in science and technology, to take up their responsibility to engage in public debate to serve the public’s right to quality independent information.

The information, submissions and other contents on this website are provided by PSGR in the public interest and for professional scientific and medical discussion. This does not imply that all of the views expressed are held by all Trustees. Links to other sources of information do not imply an endorsement by PSGR of that organisation.

Subcategories

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For over 20 years the Physicians and Scientists for Global Responsibility New Zealand Charitable Trust (PSGR) has produced reports and submitted to government Bills and Inquiries.

We’ve been extraordinarily busy over the past 2 years with our work.

This Update aims to inform members and colleagues – and act as a go-to summary of our recent work.

2022 UPDATE - PDF

As well as our recent work All PSGR’s submissions are available to the public on our Submissions pages. In addition, we are now on LinkedIn, Twitter, Odysee & Instagram.

MEMBERSHIP

Please – without your support and membership PSGR cannot do this work. We’ve kept our fees deliberately low because your membership is important to us.

MOVING FORWARD 2022+

The PSGR recognise that the perspectives that have been expressed by the PSGR from 2020 onwards will not necessarily reflect the perspectives of all trustees and all members.

However, we sincerely hope that PSGR’s perspectives are more likely to reflect the perspectives of the majority of our membership and of collegial organisations – which represents a diverse quorum of inquiring minds.

We hope that we have demonstrated a consistency to our work, that reflects and upholds the principles reflected in 20 years of research, information communications and submissions to policy

Reports and Papers

Royal Commission

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