RCGM Witness Brief Peter Wills

Publications & Resources

Witness Brief Royal Commission on Genetic Modification

1. Contact Information

Name and Address of Witness Peter R Wills, Position Associate Professor, Postal Address Department of Auckland, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, Courier Address 6th Floor Office, Maths/Physics Building, 38 Princes Street, Auckland, Phone 09 - 373 7599 ext 8889, Fax 09 - 373 7445, Email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Signed Date 5 November 2000

4. Name of Witness Peter R Wills

Peter Wills is a theoretical biologist who gained his PhD in Biochemistry in 1977. His doctoral thesis included papers published on theological topics. Since then he has held fulltime positions at a variety of leading overseas institutes:

Postdoctoral Fellow, John Curtin School of Medical Research, Canberra, (1977–79)

Group Leader, Max Planck Institute for Molecular Genetics, Berlin (1979–81)

Visiting Scientist, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland (1988)

Humboldt Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Biophysical Chemistry, Göttingen (1989)

Visiting Scientist, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico (1997)

Humboldt Fellow, National Research Centre for Information Technology, Bonn (2001)

He is employed in New Zealand as an Associate Professor in Physics at the University of Auckland where he was first appointed in 1981. He has published widely in the international scientific literature covering a number of different fields: biochemistry, theoretical physics, molecular genetics and complexity theory. His most recent research has been concerned with the early stages of biological evolution, especially the origins of genetic coding and biological information processing. He was a lecturer at the 1998 "Spontaneous Order of Life" Summer School of the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen.

Some of Peter Wills' collaborative research work into prions, the infectious agents active in transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, has involved the contained laboratory use of microbial genetic engineering for gene amplification and functional protein analysis.

Peter Wills has had extensive experience in making submissions, both written and oral, to the New Zealand Environmental Risk Management Authority (as well as its predecessor, the Interim Assessment Group) and the Australia New Zealand Food Authority. He is currently a party to an appeal in the High Court against a decision of ERMA to allow AgResearch Ltd, a Crown Research Institute, to conduct field trials of genetically engineered cattle.

During a ten-year secondment to the Auckland Medical School Peter Wills became active in affirmative action programmes for Maori and Pasifika students. Later, fellow biologist Mere Roberts and he established a course in the Arts and Science Faculties at the University of Auckland entitled "Indigenous Knowledge and Western Science". From this grew an abiding interest in Maori and other Pacific epistemologies. In 1997 Mere and Peter contributed to a volume entitled "Tribal Epistemologies - Essays in the Philosophy of Anthropology".

From his experience as a student of science and a conscientious objector to military service in 1970 Peter Wills developed a critique of the role of science and technology in global political affairs. He was a Co-Founder of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (New Zealand) and participated in two conferences in Moscow, organised jointly by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Federation of American Scientists, that were influential in moderating Soviet policy and helping end the Cold War. In a High Court case that lasted 6 years, Peter Wills was sued for four million dollars by corporate interests for comments he made in 1990 concerning industry connections with nuclear weapons production. The case was eventually discontinued and he was awarded all of his costs. For the period 1993-1996 Peter Wills was Chairperson of Greenpeace New Zealand.

Since the mid-1980s Peter Wills has been a vocal public critic of genetic engineering, both in New Zealand and abroad. His analysis has been published internationally. He was an invited speaker at the 1994 Third World Network Conference in Penang that resulted in the scientists' statement "The Need for Greater Regulation and Control of Genetic Engineering" and in 1999 he was the only foreign invitee to the first Australian Consensus Conference on "Gene Technology in the Food Chain" held at Parliament in Canberra. He is a Trustee of Physicians and Scientists for Responsible Genetics (NZ).

5. Name of “Interested Person” (on behalf of whom the Witness will appear)

Physicians and Scientists for Responsible Genetics

Greenpeace New Zealand

Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand

Friends of the Earth

Sustainable Futures Trust

Pacific Institute of Resource Management

6. Witness Brief Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Molecular biologists cannot describe with any satisfactory degree of accuracy what happens when an organism is genetically engineered. There is very high inherent uncertainty in the processes of genetic engineering. Biological processes are inherently uncontrollable. The eventual ecological and evolutionary effects of genetic engineering are expected to be extraordinary, perhaps unintentionally devastating for the biosphere. Reasonable caution demands that the products of genetic engineering should not be released into the environment. New Zealand should adopt its current "GE-free" status as a national policy, applied to both natural and managed ecosystems. Contained use of genetic engineering in laboratory research and the production of medicines poses little risk when it is properly managed. Controls over the use of genetically engineered microbes in laboratories, particularly disposal practices, should be tightened. Institutional Biosafety Committees are in need of reform.

The legislative framework for the welfare of genetically engineered animals is inadequate.

The Environmental Risk Management Authority has been too permissive and has not responded to public concerns that fall outside the sphere of technical scientific considerations.

The Australia New Zealand Food Authority is doctrinaire and biased toward multinational corporate interests. It is incapable of addressing matters of genuine public concern.

The Maori worldview retains perspectives that have been systematically eliminated from mainstream scientific thinking. Rapprochement within the context of decision-making about genetic engineering would be advanced if decisive weight were given to considerations of whakapapa, mauri and tapu. Genetic engineering represents an extension of the process of colonisation into the territory of Nature's genetic repository. The Wai262 Claim being considered by the Waitangi Tribunal challenges human arrogation of Nature's repository of knowledge and challenges the legitimacy of legal ownership of forms of life.

The ethically compromised position of science at the end of WWII has continued to erode its autonomy in the intervening half-century. Self-regulation is no longer a possibility, especially in relation to genetic engineering.

The techniques of genetic engineering should not be available for military applications.

Scientists' conflicts of interest is a matter of serious concern in relation to the assessment and evaluation of applications of genetic engineering.

7. Recommendations

The Warrant has set the Commission the task of receiving representations upon, inquiring into, investigating, and reporting on the items set out in Section A (1) and (2) below A (1) the strategic options available to enable New Zealand to address, now and in the future, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

A (1) Summary

New Zealand is currently in the position of having no genetically engineered organisms released into the environment. New Zealand should maintain its "GE-free" status into the foreseeable future. This judgement is based on an assessment of the uncertainties and uncontrollability of genetic engineering and its consequences.

Genetic engineering as provides a valuable set of laboratory and research techniques which are available for use in full containment, including pharmaceutical production, subject to proper legislative and ethical controls.

New Zealand should declare an immediate moratorium on the release of any genetically engineered organisms into the environment, and the incorporation of genetically engineered organisms, their parts, products and processes, into the food chain.

Response:

A (1) Sections 1 & 2.

A (2) any changes considered desirable to the current legislative, regulatory, policy, or institutional arrangements for addressing, in New Zealand, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

A (2) Summary

It would be desirable for New Zealand to declare itself to be "GE-free" and disallow the release of any genetically engineered organisms into the environment. Such a declaration should also establish a "GE-free" food supply, banning the use of genetically engineered organisms, their parts, products and processes. This national status would best be achieved through legislation.

In the interim, the current moratorium should be extended for a reasonable period, of the order of a half-decade. Rules for the disposal of routinely produced genetically engineered material from laboratories should be reviewed, with consideration given to ensuring that DNA from them cannot find its way into wild microbial flora. Any such change in regulations is not incompatible with a diminution in the amount of form-filling required of researchers who routinely use approved laboratory techniques of genetic engineering.

Institutional Biosafety Committees should be reformed to make them more independent of the researchers who apply to them.

Animal Welfare legislation is inadequate in respect of suffering to animals that may be caused by their creation through genetic engineering. ERMA has already identified this as a matter that needs to be addressed by government.

As a matter of policy, much greater weight must be given to concerns of a non-technical nature that members of the public express about applications of genetic engineering. The current provisions of the HSNO Act have been interpreted in favour of the interests of applicants, not those of the affected public. Legislative change may be necessary to effect an appropriate policy.

New Zealand should leave the Australia New Zealand Food Authority unless it is reformed to function in a manner that takes account of expressions of public concern and gives weight to considerations other than the "substantial equivalence" of different foods as determined in the interests of multinational corporations.

The Crown should initiate a process of dialogue to address the intertwined issues of Maori rangitiratanga as guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi and intellectual property rights, especially the ownership of organisms or genetic sequences as "inventions". Procedures of bodies such as ERMA should be reformed to give decisive weight to considerations of whakapapa, mauri, tapu and other Maori precepts.

Legislation is required to exclude military applications of genetic engineering.

Institutions involved with all aspects of genetic engineering (regulation, evaluation, use, funding, etc.) should be reformed better to take account of the breadth of public concern by including those who express criticism or skepticism.

Response:

A (2) Section 1-4.

Section B Relevant Matters

The Warrant has set the Commission the task of receiving representations upon, inquiring into, and investigating, the matters set out in Section B (a) – (n) below B (a) where, how, and for what purpose genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products are being used in New Zealand at present

B (a) Summary

Genetic engineering is used widely for research purposes in forestry, agriculture, horticulture biology and medicine

Response:

B (a) Section 1.7.1

B (b) the evidence (including the scientific evidence), and the level of uncertainty, about the present and possible future use, in New Zealand, of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (b) Summary

Genetic engineering entails an extremely high degree of inherent uncertainty, especially in respect of its overall consequences for the environment. This is because ecological and evolutionary processes are themselves uncontrollable. The release genetically engineered organisms into the environment has the potential to be even more destructive than the consequences of other human interference in biological processes.

Response:

B (b) Sections 1.1-1.7, 3.6

B (c) the risks of, and the benefits to be derived from, the use or avoidance of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products in New Zealand, including:

(i) the groups of persons who are likely to be advantaged by each of those benefits

(ii) the groups of persons who are likely to be disadvantaged by each of those risks

B (c) Summary

In all fields of endeavour to which genetic engineering can be applied the benefits accrue largely to the powerful economic players - agricultural and pharmaceutical corporations, governmental agencies and research institutions. Only in the field of medicine can it really be argued that individuals reap any significant direct benefit.

The risks arising from genetic engineering are almost completely socialised. It is the community as a whole which will end up bearing the cost of adverse effects that can arise from genetic engineering.

Response:

B (c) Sections 1.5-1.7, 2.4, 4.1

B (d) the international legal obligations of New Zealand in relation to genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (d) Summary

Successive New Zealand governments have become parties to a number of agreements affecting citizens who have had no say in the matter. In respect of the safety of our food supply, we are now subject to decisions that are made by an international body (ANZFA) which is dominated by industrial interests. All considerations in relation to these international obligations are dominated by scientific and technical matters and the unique cultural and ethical perspective of New Zealanders is given absolutely no weight.

Response:

B (d) Section 2.5

B (e) the liability issues involved, or likely to be involved, now or in the future, in relation to the use, in New Zealand, of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (e) Summary

Liability issues arise in respect of all of the risks associated with genetic engineering but the public been given any protection beyond the legal requirement of due diligence being exercised by regulatory authorities. The potential hazards cannot be assessed let alone quantified.

Response:

B (e) Section 2.4

B (f) the intellectual property issues involved, or likely to be involved, now or in the future, in relation to the use in New Zealand of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (f) Summary

Intellectual property law has been developed using a set of concepts and precedents which do not take account of the cultural constructs of all New Zealanders and which cannot rightly be applied to living organisms or genes. Allowing the patenting of genetic sequences and whole organisms enables those who conduct research involving genetic engineering to take illegitimate control of Nature.

Response

B (f) Section 3.6-3.7

B (g) the Crown’s responsibilities under the Treaty of Waitangi in relation to genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (g) Summary

The Crown has a duty of partnership under the Treaty to allow Maori concerns for whakapapa, mauri and tapu to carry decisive weight in questions concerning genetic engineering.

Response:

B (g) Sections 6.1-6.7

B (h) the global developments and issues that may influence the manner in which New Zealand may use, or limit the use of, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (h) Summary

Genetic engineering does not provide an appropriate basis on which to build acceptable solutions to the looming problems of human population, food production, land use, resource management, water and energy that face humanity in the medium term (a century or less).

Response:

B (h) Sections 4.1.1-4.1.2, 4.2.1

B (i) the opportunities that may be open to New Zealand from the use or avoidance of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (i) Summary

Research and limited, contained use in medicine are currently the only adequately safe uses for genetic engineering, a situation which is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.

Response:

B (i) Sections 1 & 2

B (j) the main areas of public interest in genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products, including those related to:

(i) human health (including biomedical, food safety, and consumer choice)

(ii) environmental matters (including biodiversity, biosecurity issues, and the health of ecosystems)

(iii) economic matters (including research and innovation, business development, primary production, and exports)

(iv) cultural and ethical concerns

B (j) Summary

Provided it can be guaranteed that there are not general side effects from individuals seeking cures to medical problems of genetic origin, the contained use of genetic engineering in medical research and production should proceed.

The consequences of genetic engineering are so uncertain and uncontrollable, particularly in regard to ecological and evolutionary processes, that the protection of the environment demands that humans do not deposit the products of their GE experimentation in the wild.

There has developed a complete imbalance in the allocation of scientific and health research funds in favour of the narrow view of molecular biology. Researchers working from a broader or more traditional perspective have tended to be ignored for the last two decades.

The values of life and spirituality that are peculiar to the Maori perspective have not been given decisive weight in matters concerning genetic engineering. Greater attention must be paid to the more general ethical and cultural concerns about genetic engineering of interest to both Maori and non-Maori.

Response:

B (j) (i) Sections 2.2, 2.5

Response:

B (j) (ii) Sections 1.5, 1.7, 2.2

Response:

B (j) (iii) Section 4

Response:

B (j) (iv) Sections 3 & 4

B (k) the key strategic issues drawing on ethical, cultural, environmental, social, and economic risks and benefits arising from the use of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

B (k) Summary

The key strategic issues facing New Zealand are:

(i) the protection of the biosphere against the adverse effects of genetic engineering, and.

(ii) the protection of diverse cultural perspectives based on the Treaty.

Response:

B (k) Sections 1.5-1.7, 3.1, 3.5, 3.6

B (l) the international implications, in relation to both New Zealand’s binding international obligations and New Zealand’s foreign and trade policy, of any measures that New Zealand might take with regard to genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products, including the costs and risks associated with particular options

B (l) Summary

New Zealand should openly pursue an independent GE-free policy (irrespective of any threats made) even to the extent of its participation in United Nations peace-keeping.

Response:

B (l) Section 4.1.4

B (m) the range of strategic outcomes for the future application or avoidance of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products in New Zealand

B (m) Summary

It is in New Zealand's best interests to maintain the character of those parts of our natural and agricultural ecologies which have survived the excesses of industrial and technological onslaught.

All of the desirable outcomes of applying genetic engineering in research and medicine can be achieved without in any way compromising the GE-free status of the New Zealand environment.

Response:

B (m) Section 3.6

B (n) whether the statutory and regulatory processes controlling genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products in New Zealand are adequate to address the strategic outcomes that, in your opinion, are desirable, and whether any legislative, regulatory, policy, or other changes are needed to enable New Zealand to achieve these outcomes.

B (n) Summary

There is inadequate statutory and regulatory control over genetic engineering in New Zealand.

(i) Small scale experiments involving the use of laboratory microbes are not subject to satisfactory rules of containment especially in respect of disposal. Effects on the microbial flora of the environment are not adequately minimised under current procedures.

(ii) Forestry, horticultural and entomological research involving genetic engineering should be restricted to fully contained facilities (for example, containment glass houses).

(iii) Ethically acceptable experimentation with mammalian transgenesis for medical and research purposes should be restricted to the minimal number of species, preferably only mice, securely contained in laboratory buildings.

(iv) Institutional bio-safety committees should be given constitutions that set their membership aside from any interests of those who apply to them and should not be able to be dominated by genetic engineers.

(v) The HSNO Act should be changed so that weight is given to concerns within the community that arise from ethical and cultural perspectives, not purely from the consideration of technical details. This should apply not only to Maori perspectives, but also to religious and spiritual concerns expressed by many sectors of our community.

(vi) New Zealand should reassert its own sovereignty over the control of food safety and regulation.

(vii) Provision should be made for adequate representation of perspectives critical of genetic engineering on all relevant representative bodies such as Committees of MORST, IBAC, the Royal Society, ERMA, ANZFA, etc.

Response:

B (n) (i) Section 2.2

Response:

B (n) (ii) Section 1.4.2

Response:

B (n) (iii) Sections 2.3.3

Response:

B (n) (iv) Section 2.2.2

Response:

B (n) (v) Section 2.3

Response:

B (n) (vi) Section 2.5

Response:

B (n) (vii) Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4